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I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Jones,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the Fourth Amendment is violated when police, without a warrant, 
attach a Global–Positioning–System (GPS) device to a suspect’s vehicle 
and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,2 a ruling which 
 
 ∗ Marc McAllister is a 2003 graduate of Notre Dame Law School, and is the author of ten 
publications.  The author dedicates this article to his faithful and loving wife, Candy. 
 1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 2. More specifically, Jones ruled that the Government’s installation of a GPS tracking device 
on a suspect’s vehicle, and its subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search,” id. at 949, a ruling which effectively imposes Fourth 
Amendment protections upon this form of investigation. 
1
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has significantly restrained law enforcement’s ability to utilize this 
method of investigation.3  Prior to Jones, warrantless GPS tracking had 
been common, and most courts were unwilling to extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to this investigative technique.4  In unanimously 
rejecting these decisions, the Jones ruling was surprising5 and reveals a 
Court concerned by the potential for mass surveillance inherent in this 
form of investigation.6  Perhaps more importantly, the Justices in Jones 
employed distinct rationales, with the majority returning to a trespass-
based analysis unused since the 1960’s,7 a potentially groundbreaking 
 
 3. In response to Jones, the FBI turned off about 3,000 GPS tracking devices that were in use.  
See Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-
thousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/.  
 4. Prior to Jones, most lower courts had ruled that when police use a GPS device to monitor a 
vehicle’s movements in public, no “search” occurs under the principle that it is not reasonable to expect 
privacy in one’s movements in public.  See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–
17 (9th Cir. 2010) (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in 
his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking is not a search); United States v. Marquez, 
605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[w]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is 
transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a public place, they 
install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”).  See also United 
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of 
using [GPS tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the [Supreme] 
Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which 
they reveal to third parties or leave open to view by others.”). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D. Mass. 2012) (describing Jones 
“as a surprise to many” in light of the lower courts’ many rulings to the contrary). 
 6. The potential for mass surveillance that concerned the Jones Court included the potential to 
investigate the law-abiding citizen, as well as those suspected of criminal activity, on no suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  Several Justices voiced this concern during oral argument.  For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts inquired: “You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, 
monitored our movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under your theory?” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf.  Reacting to the same 
concern, Justice Ginsburg inquired: “I think you answered the question that the government’s position 
would mean that any of us could be monitored whenever we leave our homes.  So, the only thing secure 
is the home.  Is—I mean, that is—that is the end point of your argument, that an electronic device, as 
long as it’s not used inside the house, is okay.”  Id. at 12. 
 7. To determine whether a particular form of investigation constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
“search,” thereby triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections, most courts over the past forty-five 
years have applied the Katz test, under which a “search” occurs when “the government[’s] [conduct] 
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”  Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).  See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining 
whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States.”).  Rather than apply the Katz 
test, the Jones majority applied the pre-Katz physical trespass doctrine; in doing so, the Court clarified 
that the Katz test governs only those “search” questions that do not involve an actual physical trespass.  
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).  
2
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move in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.8 
While the Jones majority’s return to a trespass-based approach leaves 
many questions unanswered,9 perhaps the most important, unresolved 
aspect of Jones is whether a Fourth Amendment “search” would occur 
in the event the same type of monitoring could be accomplished in the 
absence of a trespass10—most notably, where a suspect’s location is 
determined through a GPS-enabled cell phone.11   
According to all nine Justices in Jones, instances of GPS tracking that 
do not require a trespass will be governed by the more traditional Katz 
test,12 under which a “search” occurs when “the government[’s] 
 
 8. See United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2012) 
(describing the Katz test as “the predominant approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the 
1960s,” and stating that the Jones Court’s “property-based trespass analysis alters the matrix most 
frequently applied in the assessment of Fourth Amendment issues because questions of ownership or the 
existence of a legally cognizable property interest have not generally been considered of controlling 
analytical importance [under the Katz test]”)  The potential to apply Jones’s trespass approach to Fourth 
Amendment “search” issues more broadly has already begun to alter Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Indeed, recent courts have employed the Jones majority’s trespass-based analysis in cases going beyond 
GPS tracking, such as, for example, public camera monitoring.  See, e.g., United States v. Nowka, No. 
5:11-cr-00474-VEH-HGD, 2012 WL 2862139, at *4 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that a pole camera installed outside defendant’s residence and trained on this driveway was a 
“search” under Jones because no trespass on Nowka’s property occurred in the installation of the pole 
camera). 
 9. See Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (“the Jones decision left a number of issues unresolved, 
among them 1) whether the government must obtain a warrant to install and use a GPS tracking device, 
2) if not, what quantum of suspicion is required (e.g., probable cause, reasonable suspicion), 3) if the 
Fourth Amendment is violated, whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression, and 4) if so, what 
evidence must be suppressed”).  See generally Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions 
After United States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS case”, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491 (2013) 
(identifying and discussing critical questions that follow in the wake of Jones).   
 10. The Jones majority deemed it dispositive that “Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the 
Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device,” distinguishing him from someone who takes 
possession of property upon which such a device has already been installed.  United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 952.  The majority distinguished Karo on these grounds because in that case, “Karo accepted 
the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s 
presence, even though it was used to monitor the container’s location” in much the same way as 
modern-day GPS.  Id.  Noting the potentially broader impact of the Court’s trespass-based rationale, 
some courts post-Jones have described Jones as signaling “a particular concern for government trespass 
upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] enumerates.”  Figueroa-
Cruz, 914 F.Supp.2d at 1260. 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779–80 (6th Cir. 2012) (In a case where 
law enforcement “pinged” a suspect’s phone to determine its location, the court distinguished Jones on 
the grounds that “[n]o such physical intrusion [of the suspect’s phone] occurred in [this] case.  [The 
suspect] himself obtained the cell phone for the purpose of communication, and that phone included the 
GPS technology used to track the phone’s whereabouts.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 12. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).  See also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“But ‘[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass 
would remain subject to Katz analysis.’”); id. at 959–61 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the Jones 
majority erred in reviving the trespass test because “the Katz Court repudiated the old [trespass] 
doctrine,” and suggesting that any and all “search” questions should be governed exclusively by Katz). 
3
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[conduct] violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.”13  While four Justices in Jones did not 
specifically address the constitutionality of GPS tracking under the Katz 
test, five concurring Justices did.14  Given that a majority of Justices 
have already applied Katz to analyze a GPS tracking issue, and given 
that the underlying rationale employed by these Justices would naturally 
extend to similar forms of tracking by way of GPS-enabled cell 
phones,15 the views of the concurring Justices in Jones will undoubtedly 
influence these unresolved issues.16   
According to those five concurring Justices,17 tracking the suspect’s 
vehicle for twenty-eight days constituted a search under the Katz test.18  
These Justices did not identify the precise point at which the tracking 
became a search, but simply declared that “the line was surely crossed 
before the 4-week mark.”19  In light of this opinion, a suspect like 
Antoine Jones can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements in public where those movements are tracked for twenty-
eight days or longer.20  At the other end of the spectrum, the Court’s 
 
 13. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).  See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
 14. See United States v. Hanna, No. 11-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 
2012) (“[F]ive members of the [Jones] Court concluded that [the majority’s] trespass theory did not 
form a sufficiently comprehensive analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS monitoring 
and argued that GPS monitoring should also (in the case of Justice Sotomayor) or only (in the case of 
Justice Alito) be analyzed to determine whether it has invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 15. As argued below, despite a potential distinction between GPS tracking and cell phone 
tracking, location information obtained by way of GPS-enabled cell phone enables the Government to 
obtain essentially the same location information as that provided by the surreptitiously-installed GPS 
device utilized in Jones, thereby implicating the same length of surveillance concerns of the Jones 
concurring Justices.  See infra notes 154–161 and accompanying text. 
 16. See, e.g., State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (Eckerstrom, J., 
dissenting) (“My colleagues maintain that our result in this case is compelled by the Court’s reasoning 
in [United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983),] that a person has ‘no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements’ on public roads.  But, in the context we address today—the GPS tracking of a 
person’s movements on public roads—five [J]ustices of the Court have implicitly declined to adopt that 
part of Knotts’s reasoning.  I, therefore, cannot agree that this aspect of Knotts must control our 
reasoning in this case.”). 
 17. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which was signed by three additional Justices, described 
the issue as “[w]hether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term 
monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 18. Id. at 964. 
 19. Id.  See also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Alito concurrence that 
“at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy’”). 
 20. At least for the particular type of suspect at issue in Jones, a suspected drug dealer.  See id. at 
948 (describing the suspect, Antoine Jones, as someone who the police suspected was “trafficking in 
narcotics”). 
4
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prior holding in United States v. Knotts21 suggests that a person 
traveling on public roads for just a few hours cannot reasonably expect 
privacy in those movements,22 a decision Jones was careful not to 
overrule.23  The line between these two points remains unclear.24 
Complicating matters, the concurring Justices in Jones suggested that 
a twenty-eight day monitoring would not constitute a search where the 
investigation involved a more serious offense than that in Jones,25 and 
the remaining Justices conceded that “[w]e may have to grapple with 
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory 
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis.”26 
This article examines these “vexing problems”27 in depth.  Since 
Jones was decided in January 2012, courts in GPS tracking cases have 
already begun making distinctions based upon the type of suspect and 
length of surveillance.28  Through empirical studies, I set out to explore 
 
 21. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 22. In Knotts the Court upheld the warrantless use of a beeper to track a drum of chloroform 
from the defendant’s point of purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away.  According to the Court, the 
use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the beeper did not provide any information police 
could not have obtained through visual surveillance along the vehicle’s route.  Just one year after Knotts, 
the Court in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), examined a similar case and reached the 
opposite result as in Knotts, primarily because the beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether 
inside a private residence. 
 23. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (distinguishing Knotts as a case where the Court’s trespass 
concerns did not apply because “[t]he beeper had been placed in the container before it came into 
Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner”).  See also U.S. v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 
F.Supp.2d 1250, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that Jones did not overrule Knotts, but rather 
distinguished it based on “the ownership or exclusivity of the use of the chattel” at issue). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Justice Alito’s 
concurrence and the majority in Jones both recognized that there is little precedent for what constitutes a 
level of comprehensive tracking that would violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 25. Writing on behalf of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice Alito wrote: “[R]elatively 
short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy 
that our society has recognized as reasonable.  But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.  For such offenses, society’s 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Writing separately, Justice Sotomayor appeared to ratify Justice Alito’s 
suggestion when she wrote: “I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”  Id. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  With the addition of Justice Sotomayor, five Justices in 
Jones appear willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon not only the length of 
surveillance, but also the type of suspect at issue.   
 26. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
 27. Perhaps these are “vexing problems” for the Court because if Justice Alito’s approach were 
taken literally, the Fourth Amendment would no longer protect all American citizens equally.  Rather, 
the suspected criminals, the “bad guys” if you will, would enjoy fewer Fourth Amendment protections 
than the purely “innocent,” law-abiding citizens would enjoy. 
 28. See infra notes 162–204 and accompanying text.   
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whether society is likewise ready to embrace such distinctions.29   
In the months following Jones, I administered two surveys designed 
to test this hypothesis; each professionally designed30 and inspired by 
similar instruments administered by Fourth Amendment scholar 
Christopher Slobogin.31 
My first survey poses a series of questions involving GPS tracking of 
seven different types of suspects, including: individuals not suspected of 
any crime, individuals suspected of minor crimes, and individuals 
suspected of relatively severe crimes.  My essential hypothesis was that 
society would be willing to permit police to engage in warrantless GPS 
tracking for a longer period of time when investigating the most serious 
offenses.   
After collecting over 230 survey responses, this hypothesis was 
seemingly verified.  For example, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 
of 230), would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to 
the vehicle of an innocent suspect32 and monitor that vehicle’s 
movements without first obtaining a warrant.  By contrast, 67.3% of 
survey respondents would have permitted a suspected terrorist’s vehicle 
to be tracked with no warrant, and those individuals were generally 
willing to permit a much lengthier period of surveillance for the 
suspected terrorist as compared to those suspected of less severe 
crimes.33  This evidence appears to validate the notion that Fourth 
Amendment protections with respect to GPS tracking should vary based 
upon the nature of the crime under investigation, with one of those 
variations being the permissible length of warrantless surveillance.  
To specifically examine the constitutionality of cell phone tracking, I 
conducted a second survey posing questions relating to both GPS 
 
 29. Society’s views are arguably relevant under the Katz standard because the Katz test itself, 
taken literally, anticipates examination of society’s actual expectations of privacy.  See Marc McAllister, 
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 475, 505–08 (2012) (arguing in support of the empirical approach). 
 30. I designed each survey with the help of an instructional design consultant, Dr. Raoul A. 
Arreola.  Dr. Arreola retired from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center in 2009 with the 
rank of professor emeritus.  He holds a doctorate in educational psychology, specializing in research 
design, measurement, and evaluation, as well as an undergraduate degree in mathematics and physical 
sciences.  Over the last forty-two years, he has worked primarily in the areas of instructional evaluation 
and development, faculty evaluation and development, and the use of technology in the teaching and 
learning process.  
 31. See infra notes 208–219 and accompanying text. 
 32. As used here, the term “innocent suspect” refers to an individual who has not previously 
been convicted of a crime and who is not currently suspected of committing any crime. 
 33. For example, when asked whether a suspected terrorist could be tracked without a warrant, 
89 of 226 survey respondents, or 39.4%, would have permitted such an individual to be tracked without 
a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.  By contrast, when asked whether a suspected drug dealer 
could be tracked without a warrant, only 20.6% of respondents, or 46 of 223, would have permitted such 
an individual to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.   
6
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tracking by physical trespass upon a suspect’s vehicle, approximating 
the issue in Jones; and the monitoring of a suspect’s movements by 
GPS-enabled cell phone, an issue currently unresolved by the Supreme 
Court.34   
In this second survey, respondents were given two distinct series of 
questions.  In the first series of questions, respondents were asked to 
assume that police had attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s 
vehicle by way of trespass and had used that device to monitor the 
suspect’s movements for a period of time.  In the second series of 
questions, identical to the first in most respects,35 respondents were 
instead asked to assume that police were able to monitor an individual’s 
movements by way of cell phone.   
The results of this second survey, summarized in Part V, suggest 
several important conclusions for the future of warrantless cell phone 
tracking.  First, as a general matter, society deems electronically-stored 
information presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of whether that data is obtained surreptitiously by the police 
or obtained directly from a cell phone provider.  Second, as with the first 
survey, society appears willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections 
in regards to GPS tracking based upon the nature of the crime under 
investigation, with length of surveillance as one of those variations.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society believed that tracking an 
individual by cell phone should receive somewhat greater Fourth 
Amendment protection than tracking an individual in the manner 
employed in Jones.  This particular finding suggests that cell phone 
tracking, despite its currently limited protection, should be subject to at 
least the same constraints as those imposed in Jones.36  In combination, 
 
 34. See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“With 
increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this 
case by enlisting factory—or owner—installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”); 
see also id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the ability of cell phones to track a person’s 
movements). 
 35. Emphasizing the parallel to GPS tracking, the lead-in language for the second series of 
questions was as follows: “Cell phone technology, coupled with the widespread use of smart phones 
among American citizens, has enabled police to determine a person’s movements with nearly as much 
accuracy as a GPS device mounted on that person’s vehicle.  Cell phone data, for example, is often used 
to reveal where a cell phone was located at a particular point in time by identifying which cell tower 
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was utilized to make a call.  Cell location data makes 
it possible to determine a person’s movements with precision, and can operate successfully even when 
the phone is simply turned on, regardless of whether a call has been made or not.  Cell phone companies 
maintain accurate records of cell phone location information for all of its customers, making it possible 
for police to obtain a suspect’s location information by a simple request to a cell phone provider, such as 
AT&T or Verizon.  Please answer the following questions related to this emerging form of police 
investigation.” 
 36. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing regularity, the 
7
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these findings point to a proposal, set forth in Part V, that treats all 
forms of GPS and cell phone tracking alike for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment and that alters the level of suspicion required by the Fourth 
Amendment based upon the length of surveillance and type of crime 
under investigation. 
Part II of this article summarizes the major United States Supreme 
Court cases that impact the developing law of GPS tracking.  Part III 
highlights the two primary lines of GPS tracking cases that exist today: 
those, like Jones, that involve the trespassory attachment of a GPS 
device to a suspect’s vehicle; and those, numerous among the lower 
courts, that address the tracking of a suspect’s movements by GPS-
enabled smart phone.  Part IV sets forth the detailed results of each of 
my surveys.  Part V addresses how my survey results impact the 
constitutionality of monitoring a suspect’s movements by cell phone.37  
Part VI concludes. 
II. SUPREME COURT CASES ON GPS AND ELECTRONIC TRACKING 
A. The Law of Electronic Tracking Pre-Jones 
In the years preceding Jones, police departments around the country 
were utilizing GPS tracking devices to monitor the movements of 
criminal suspects without warrants.38  When suspects challenged the 
 
Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory—
or owner—installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.  In cases of electronic or 
other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority 
opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 37. While tracking a suspect’s movements by cell phone is the most likely method of tracking to 
follow in the wake of Jones, post-Jones courts have upheld the warrantless attachment of a GPS 
tracking device to a target vehicle by finding an insufficient property interest in the vehicle at issue on 
the part of the particular defendant.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1262–64 
(N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. White, 484 F.3d 267, 281 (4th Cir. 2007) (detailing an extensive 
federal drug investigation in Maryland involving various investigative techniques, including GPS 
trackers); United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that, as part of their 
investigation into robberies, police in Michigan “secretly placed a GPS tracking device on the 
[defendant’s] rental car” while it was parked at an apartment complex); United States v. Santiago, 560 
F.3d 62, 64–65 (1st Cir. 2009) (detailing “a year-long investigation into a large-scale heroin distribution 
operation” that occurred in 2003 and 2004 in Massachusetts, in which “agents tracked [defendant’s] van 
with a GPS unit and conducted visual surveillance of it; conducted court authorized wiretaps of cell 
phones of the defendants; [and] tracked and observed transactions among the defendants revealed by 
cell phone conversations”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“over a four-month period, [DEA] agents [in Oregon] repeatedly monitored Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep using 
various types of mobile tracking devices,” and that agents installed the devices on seven different 
occasions); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2010) (recounting how DEA and 
Iowa state officers placed a GPS tracking device on the bumper of a Ford while it was parked in a 
Walmart parking lot in Des Moines, Iowa, and subsequently used the device to monitor the vehicle’s 
8
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constitutionality of that warrantless police conduct, most courts had 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to this method of 
investigation under the simple logic that no person can reasonably 
expect privacy in his movements in public.39  To support that result, 
courts analogized GPS tracking to one of two Supreme Court cases from 
the 1980’s, each involving the tracking of a vehicle by electronic beeper. 
In United States v. Knotts,40 the Court upheld the warrantless use of a 
beeper to track a drum of chloroform from the defendant’s point of 
purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away.41  According to Knotts, the 
use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the beeper did 
not provide any information police could not have obtained through 
visual surveillance along the vehicle’s route.42   
Just one year after Knotts, the Court in United States v. Karo43 
examined a similar case and reached the opposite result, primarily 
because the beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a 
private residence.44  Distinguishing the public surveillance in Knotts, the 
Court reasoned that “indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been 
 
movements back and forth to Colorado); United States v. Smith, 387 Fed. App’x. 918, 919 (11th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (describing an investigation in Florida in which police installed a GPS device on the 
truck of a person suspected of trafficking marijuana); United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 
272–73 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing an investigation in which Arizona police attached a GPS tracking 
device to the suspect’s Jeep which was programmed to send text message updates of the Jeep’s location 
every four minutes, then tracked the Jeep’s movements into several states, eventually leading to the 
suspect’s arrest in Illinois). 
 39. See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216–17 (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS 
tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking is 
not a search); Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (“[w]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular 
vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a public 
place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”).  See also 
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of using [GPS 
tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the [Supreme] Court’s 
consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which they reveal 
to third parties or leave open to view by others.”).  
 40. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 41. Having suspected Knotts of manufacturing drugs, federal officers, without a warrant, had 
installed a beeper in a chemical drum they knew would be sold to Knotts.  With the beeper’s assistance, 
officers followed Knotts’s vehicle to where it stopped outside a certain cabin.  Based on this 
information, the police secured a warrant to search the cabin, and uncovered incriminating evidence 
inside.  Id. at 278–79. 
 42. According to the Knotts Court, “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” 
and the “use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the vehicle] . . . does not alter the situation.”  Id. at 
281–282. 
 43. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 44. Because the beeper in Karo was used to monitor the can’s movements within a private 
residence, see id. at 714, the Court described the issue as follows, “whether the monitoring of a beeper 
in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights 
of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”  Id. at 714. 
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withdrawn from public view” must remain subject to Fourth 
Amendment oversight.45   
Invoking Knotts and distinguishing Karo, pre-Jones GPS tracking 
cases typically concluded that when a GPS tracking device is used to 
monitor a suspect’s movements on public roads, no “search” occurs 
because the suspect cannot reasonably expect privacy in those 
movements.46  Applying the Knotts/Karo distinction, most courts 
analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking prior to 
Jones reasoned that tracking a vehicle’s movements in public is more 
akin to “non-search” forms of surveillance, such as an officer physically 
trailing a suspicious vehicle.47  However, some pre-Jones courts refused 
to apply this rationale, on the grounds that it fails to account for inherent 
differences between tracking a vehicle for a few hours by beeper and 
tracking that same vehicle for a substantially longer period of time by 
the more sophisticated GPS.48  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Jones to resolve the split.49 
B. United States v. Jones 
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court unanimously struck down 
one instance of GPS tracking in which a suspect’s vehicle was 
 
 45. As the Court explained, “[Karo] is thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper told the 
authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin. . . .  [H]ere, [by contrast] the monitoring indicated 
that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified [by the police from 
outside the house],” id. at 715, and one that “the Government is extremely interested in knowing.”  Id.  
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (invoking Knotts 
and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period 
is not a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Marquez, 
605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating in dicta that “when police have reasonable suspicion that a 
particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a 
public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”). 
 47. In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit viewed GPS 
tracking as more akin to hypothetical practices it assumed are not searches, such as tracking a car “by 
means of cameras mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging.”  See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 
994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f police  follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras 
mounted on lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search.”). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
use of a GPS tracking device to monitor an individual’s movements over a four-week period is a search, 
and rejecting the Government’s argument, based on an attempted extension of Knotts, that “[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another” even in such extended instances of GPS tracking); People v. 
Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440–44 (2009) (distinguishing Knotts, and declaring: “At first blush, it would 
appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the surveillance 
technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress of a vehicle over . . . predominantly 
public roads and, as in Knotts, these movements were at least in theory exposed to ‘anyone who wanted 
to look.’ This, however, is where the similarity ends.”). 
 49. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
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monitored on public streets for twenty-eight days.50  
In Jones, without a valid warrant,51 officers installed a GPS tracking 
device on suspect Antoine Jones’s jeep while it was parked in a public 
parking lot.52  Over the next twenty-eight days, officers used the device 
to track the movements of Jones’s vehicle.53  The resulting GPS data 
connected Jones to a structure that contained large amounts of cash and 
cocaine, evidence that was used to bring criminal charges against 
Jones.54   
Before trial, Jones unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained through the GPS tracking device.55  Following most prior GPS 
tracking decisions,56 the trial court reasoned that, just as in Knotts, “‘[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.’”57   
On appeal, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion (consisting of 
Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor58) 
considered “whether the attachment of a Global–Positioning–System 
(GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, 
constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”59   
In its phrasing of the issue, the Jones majority limited its analysis to 
the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,”60 rather than 
 
 50. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant).  
See also id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth Amendment 
“search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with the majority that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, 
‘where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally 
protected area’”). 
 51. Although the officers had obtained a warrant authorizing installation of the device, the device 
was installed after the warrant had expired and outside the jurisdiction specified in the warrant.  Id. at 
948. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  The device relayed more than 2,000 pages of data regarding the vehicle’s movements 
over the four week period.  Id.  
 54. Id. at 949. 
 55. The District Court granted the motion in part, suppressing only the data obtained while the 
vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence.  United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 
71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 56. See supra note 4. 
 57. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
 58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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within private spaces,61 potentially triggering the rationale underlying 
Knotts that one cannot reasonably expect privacy in his movements in 
public.  Effectively rejecting the principle underlying Knotts, the 
majority held that a “search” had occurred;62 since no warrant justified 
the search, the evidentiary fruits of that search had to be suppressed.63   
While all nine Justices in Jones agreed that this particular instance of 
GPS tracking triggered the protections of the Fourth Amendment,64 the 
Justices were split in their rationale.  Instead of applying the Katz test, 
the majority applied the pre-Katz physical trespass doctrine.65  Under 
this test, the majority reasoned that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term 
is used in the [Fourth] Amendment;”66 and in this case, the Government 
physically trespassed upon Jones’s vehicle by attaching the device as it 
was parked in public.67  According to the majority, “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that 
 
 61. In limiting the issue to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,” the Jones 
majority seemingly accepted the District Court’s suppression of the GPS tracking data obtained while 
the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence.  See id. at 948. 
 62. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Id. at 949. 
In its brief in Jones, the Government argued that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information that is knowingly exposed to public view, and that Antoine Jones himself had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle on public streets because that 
information was exposed to public view.  See Reply Brief for the United States at 18, 38, United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5094951.  Invoking Knotts, the Government 
argued that “[t]his case, like Knotts, involves movements of a vehicle on public streets,” which is 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 22.  In ruling for Jones, the majority effectively rejected 
the Government’s Knotts-based argument.   
 63. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (affirming the lower court’s judgment that admission of the 
evidence obtained by use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment, and refusing to address the 
Government’s argument that the warrantless “search” that occurred in this case was made reasonable, 
despite no valid warrant, by the reasonable suspicion or probable cause the officers had obtained before 
using the device). 
 64. See id. at 949 (holding that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a [Fourth 
Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant).  See also id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan that the lengthy GPS 
monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively 
requiring a warrant); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘where, as here, the Government 
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’”). 
 65. See id. at 949–52.  According to the majority, Katz did not repudiate the understanding that 
the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it 
enumerates.  See id. at 950.  Rather, “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added 
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”  Id. at 947.  Thus, as the majority saw it, 
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”  Id. at 950.  However, 
as the majority clarified, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”  Id. at 953. 
 66. Id. at 949. 
 67. According to the majority, “[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a 
protected area.”  Id. at 952. 
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device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search,’”68 
and a presumptively unreasonable one in the absence of a valid 
warrant.69 
Criticizing the majority’s trespass-based analysis, Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, 
instead employed the Katz test.70  Emphasizing the length of 
surveillance as the most important factor, the concurring Justices 
declared that the majority’s trespass-based analysis “largely disregards 
what is really important (the use of a GPS for long-term tracking) and 
instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as 
relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object 
that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation).”71  
According to these four Justices, “the lengthy monitoring that occurred 
in this case [twenty-eight days] constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment,”72 further noting that “the line [of Fourth Amendment 
protection] was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”73   
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to voice her agreement with both 
the majority and the Alito concurrence.74  According to Justice 
Sotomayor, the majority’s trespass-based analysis was sufficient to 
resolve the case75 because “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property 
for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading 
privacy interests long afforded . . . Fourth Amendment protection.”76   
Despite agreeing with the majority, Justice Sotomayor went on to 
declare that “the Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with 
trespassory intrusions on property;”77 rather, even in the absence of a 
trespass, “‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government 
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable.’”78  Employing this test, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the 
other four concurring Justices that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS 
 
 68. Id. at 949.  In a similar passage, the majority declared: “The Government physically 
occupied private property [i.e., Jones’s vehicle] for the purpose of obtaining information.  We have no 
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”  Id. 
 69. See id. at 954.   
 70. Emphasizing the length of surveillance as the critical factor, Justice Alito’s concurrence 
described the issue as “[w]hether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the 
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”  Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 71. Id. at 961. 
 72. Id. at 964. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
 75. Id. at 955. 
 76. Id. at 954. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 954–55. 
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monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations 
of privacy.’”79 
As the dust of Jones settles, we know that there are currently two 
ways in which a particular instance of GPS tracking may constitute a 
Fourth Amendment “search.”80  First, as the Jones holding makes clear, 
a “search” occurs when the Government trespassorily81 installs a GPS 
tracking device upon a suspect’s “effect” and uses that device to monitor 
the vehicle’s movements, even where those movements are monitored 
only on public streets.82  When such a trespassory attachment has taken 
place, a “search” will always have occurred, regardless of the length of 
surveillance.83   
Alternatively, when the government installs a GPS tracking device on 
or within a piece of property at a time when the particular suspect at 
issue has no legal interest in the property, the installation of the device is 
not a “trespass” and is therefore not a “search” for purposes of the 
trespassory test.84  This result applies as well when a suspect takes 
possession of an item that contains a factory-installed GPS device, as in 
the case of most modern cell phone purchases.85  In the event of no 
 
 79. Id. at 955. 
 80. See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 2012) (“An individual may 
challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.’”) (citing 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–53 (2012)); United States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 
546 (W.D. La. 2012) (“Jones established, or perhaps reiterated, that there are two ways to analyze 
[whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred]: a traditional common-law property rights test 
and the Katz/reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.”).  See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 
1414 (2013) (utilizing the same two-part “search” framework set forth in Jones). 
 81. In other words, at a time when the defendant has a legal interest in the property.  See Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (refusing to consider Jones’s status in relation to the vehicle at issue because the 
Government acknowledged, and did not challenge, that Jones was “the exclusive driver”). 
 82. See id. at 949 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”); id. at 
952 (“By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area”). See also Free 
Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 677 F.3d 519, 542–43 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 83. In such instances, Jones creates a bright-line rule, one that does not depend upon factors that 
would be relevant under a traditional Katz analysis.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the car for even a brief time, 
under the Court’s theory, the Fourth Amendment applies.”). 
 84. The Jones majority deemed it dispositive that “Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the 
Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device,” distinguishing him from someone who takes 
possession of property upon which such a device has already been installed.  Id. at 952.  The majority 
distinguished Karo on these grounds because in that case, “Karo accepted the container as it came to 
him, beeper and all, and therefore was not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was 
used to monitor the container’s location” in much the same way as modern-day GPS.  Id. 
 85. Here again, the same reasoning would apply because when a person purchases a GPS-
enabled cell phone, that person has likewise “accepted the [phone] as it [comes] to him, [GPS] and all, 
and therefore [i]s not entitled to object to the [GPS device’s] presence, even [if] it [i]s used to monitor 
the [phone]’s location.”  Id. 
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trespass, a Fourth Amendment “search” could only occur if the Katz test 
is satisfied.86  To satisfy the Katz test, the person invoking Fourth 
Amendment protection must demonstrate a reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action, an 
analysis which is necessarily fact specific.87  Under Katz, factors such as 
the length of surveillance, the nature of the suspected crime, and the 
location of the vehicle become critical, but as a totality of circumstances 
inquiry,88 other factors may be important as well.89 
III. LOWER COURT GPS TRACKING CASES POST-JONES 
A. GPS Tracking Accomplished by Way of Trespass 
Consistent with the explicit holding of Jones, post-Jones courts have 
held that when law enforcement officers attach a GPS tracking device to 
a suspect’s vehicle and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs (without regard to the 
types of factors that might be relevant under a Katz-based analysis, such 
as length of surveillance).90   
United States v. Lee91 is illustrative.  In Lee, DEA agents received a 
tip that defendant Robert Dale Lee had at one time obtained marijuana 
 
 86. Id. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
 87. Free Speech Coalition, Inc., 677 F.3d 542–43. 
 88. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has consistently voiced a preference 
for a case-by-case approach.  In 1931, the Court declared: “There is no formula for the determination of 
reasonableness.  Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.”  Go-Bart Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).  The Court in Sibron v. New York similarly declared, “[t]he 
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be 
decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.”  392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).  And, just 
recently, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones declared, “[t]he best that we can do in this case is to 
apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular 
case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”  See United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 89. As one court put it, when a defendant takes possession of a piece of property on which a GPS 
device has already been installed, the continued monitoring of the device would not be a “search” of that 
particular defendant under the trespassory test, but may constitute a “search” of the defendant under the 
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.  That analysis, however, would depend on the specific facts 
of the case.  United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028 (D. Minn. 2012).  
Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a very short monitoring of a suspect’s location on public streets), with United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in location in a private 
residence). 
 90. See e.g., Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523, 538 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“In the case before us, 
there was a physical trespass, and therefore, placement of the GPS device [on the defendant’s vehicle] 
constituted a search, without need to address [defendant’s] reasonable expectation of privacy and 
whether the facts in this case, distinguishable from the facts in Jones, would pass muster.”). 
 91. United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D. Ky. 2012). 
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from Chicago and transported it to eastern Kentucky in his car.92  
Several months later, Lee, who had been in prison on similar charges, 
reported to the United States Probation Office in London, Kentucky, for 
the last day of his supervised release.93  While Lee met with his 
probation officer, DEA Task Force Officer Brian Metzger secretly 
installed a GPS tracking device on Lee’s car.94  The tracking device, 
which had not been authorized by a judge, transmitted the location of 
Lee’s vehicle to DEA agents in real time.95 
Three days after installing the device, DEA agents noticed that Lee 
had driven to Chicago.96  The next day, the agents observed Lee’s 
vehicle moving back towards Kentucky.97  Suspecting that Lee had 
again driven to Chicago to obtain marijuana, Officer Metzger contacted 
Kentucky State Trooper Matt Hutti, told him that the vehicle “probably” 
contained marijuana, and told him that he “would have to obtain his own 
PC, probable cause, for a traffic stop.”98  When Lee reached the area 
where Hutti was stationed to intercept him, Hutti observed that Lee was 
not wearing a seatbelt as he drove past.99  Consequently, Hutti pulled 
Lee over for the seatbelt violation.100  Soon thereafter, two drug-sniffing 
dogs alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics within the car.  Officers 
then searched the car and found approximately 150 pounds of 
marijuana.101 
Lee later moved to suppress the marijuana found in his vehicle.102  On 
March 22, 2012, about two months after Jones was decided, Magistrate 
Judge Ingram recommended granting the motion to suppress.103  Judge 
Amul R. Thapar of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky agreed.104  According to Judge Thapar, “[u]nder 
even the narrowest reading of Jones, ‘when the government physically 
 
 92. Id. at 562. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 562.  
 99. Id. at 563. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Given the rather clear Jones holding, both Lee and the United States agreed that the DEA 
agents performed an illegal search when they installed a GPS device on Lee’s car without Lee’s 
knowledge or consent.  Id. at 564.  The parties therefore centered their arguments on possible exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule, including the good-faith exception and the attenuation doctrine.  See id. at 564–
71 (analyzing the issues). 
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invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.’”105  
Applying this rule, Judge Thapar found “no[] dispute that [Officer 
Metzger] physically invaded Lee’s property when he placed the GPS 
tracker on Lee’s car.”106  According to Judge Thapar, “[t]hat physical 
invasion was a trespass, and that trespass continued while the device 
transmitted information to the DEA agents.”107  Under a simple 
application of Jones, Judge Thapar thus concluded “that the DEA agents 
performed an illegal search when they installed a GPS tracking device 
on Lee’s car without a warrant.”108   
While post-Jones courts have consistently held that a “search” occurs 
when law enforcement officers attach a GPS tracking device to a 
suspect’s vehicle and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements (pursuant to the explicit holding of Jones), most of these 
courts have ultimately refused to suppress the evidence obtained as a 
result of that tracking by employing one of the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule.  For example, in United States v. Ford,109 a federal 
District Court ruled that “law enforcement must obtain a warrant to 
place a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle,” and held that “[h]ere, [the 
investigating officer] did not obtain a warrant and he therefore violated 
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”110  Despite that ruling, the 
Ford court upheld the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result 
of this Fourth Amendment violation under the exclusionary rule’s good-
faith exception outlined in Davis v. United States,111 which creates an 
exception to exclusion “when the police act with an ‘objectively 
reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful.”112  
Application of the Davis good-faith exception is a common theme 
among the post-Jones GPS tracking cases, effectively preventing 
suppression in those cases where warrantless, trespassory GPS tracking 
was conducted prior to Jones and in reasonable reliance upon existing 
case law at the time.113 
 
 105. Id. at 570–71. 
 106. Id. at 571. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  Moreover, Judge Thapar noted that “[e]ven though the DEA agents could have 
determined Lee’s location through cell phone data under [the jurisdiction’s case precedent], they could 
not obtain that same information through an illegally placed GPS device under Jones.”  Id. at 571. 
 109. United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2012). 
 110. Id. at *8. 
 111. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). Despite the lack of binding circuit court 
precedent at the time of the officer’s action, the Ford court concluded that the officer’s reliance on non-
binding precedent from “three out of four federal circuits to hear the GPS tracking device issue” prior to 
Jones was reasonable. Ford, 2012 WL 5366049, at *11. 
 112. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22–24 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting no 
dispute “that the installation of and use of GPS tracking devices, post-Jones, constitutes a ‘search’ under 
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B. GPS Tracking Accomplished Without Trespass: Cell Phone Tracking 
Law enforcement is often able to duplicate the type of tracking that 
occurred in Jones by monitoring the location of a suspect’s cell phone.  
Given that no trespass is required to monitor the location of a suspect’s 
cell phone, this method of investigation is currently subject to fewer 
constitutional constraints.  As a result, police agencies are utilizing this 
form of tracking more frequently.  Indeed, the number of requests to cell 
carriers for location information has grown “exponentially” over the 
past several years, with major wireless carriers now receiving thousands 
of requests each month.114 
Cell phone tracking by law enforcement comes in two primary forms.  
In the most precise form of tracking, cell phone providers are able to 
monitor a cell phone’s location, and subsequently transmit that 
information to law enforcement anytime a user activates the GPS on 
such a phone.115  This method of tracking is used by law enforcement 
thousands of times each year and is becoming more common.116 
United States v. Jones117 illustrates how this form of cell phone 
tracking may be used.  In Jones, agents obtained a search warrant 
authorizing them to receive “pings” with the location of a suspect’s cell 
phone for a thirty-day period.118  Thereafter, Sprint provided 
information to an officer via e-mails sent directly to the officer’s 
phone.119  The e-mails contained longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates 
and a link to a map indicating the phone’s exact location, accurate to 
 
the Fourth Amendment,” but ultimately ruling that the government’s failure to get a warrant to authorize 
its use of GPS tracking devices does not require suppression of evidence due to the Davis good-faith 
exception); Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523, 538–41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (holding that the installation 
and use of GPS tracking device on defendant’s vehicle involved a physical “trespass,” thus constituting 
a Fourth Amendment “search;” but that evidence obtained from the GPS device was admissible under 
the good-faith exception); United States v. Hardrick, 2012 WL 4883666, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2012) 
(refusing to decide the constitutionality of acquiring cell-site location information because the good-
faith exception applied and was dispositive of the defendant’s motion to suppress).  See also Kelly, 56 
A.3d at 540–41 (summarizing similar cases). 
 114. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable 
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 117, 121 (2012) (citing Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2010, 
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/18/the-snitch-in-your-pocket.html). 
 115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 116. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone 
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 491 (2012).  According to Rothstein, all cell 
phones sold since 2003 are GPS-enabled, making most phones today at least potentially trackable. 
However, a user can disable her phone’s GPS.  Moreover, whether a phone transmits GPS data may 
depend on the network and on the phone’s applications.  Id. at 493. 
 117. 2012 WL 2568200 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2012). 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *1 n.2. 
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within just a few meters.120  Using this data, officers were able to 
determine the suspect’s location, initiate a traffic stop, and eventually 
discover large amounts of illegal narcotics in the suspect’s vehicle.121  
As this case exemplifies, pinging a cell phone in this manner allows law 
enforcement to remotely obtain the precise location of a suspect’s cell 
phone in real time, information that may later lead to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence.122 
In another, similar form of cell phone tracking, police are able to 
obtain cell phone location data by identifying which cell tower 
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was either turned on 
or utilized to make a call.123  Using this technique, a suspect’s location 
can often be determined through methods of triangulation from various 
cell towers,124 although the precision of cell site data may depend on the 
distance between cell towers in the user’s vicinity,125 especially where 
triangulation is not employed.126  Cell phone companies maintain 
records of this information127—usually when a phone sends and receives 
text messages and at the beginning and end of each call128—making it 
possible for law enforcement to request either “real time” cell site 
information or “historical” cell site information.129  With historical cell 
 
 120. Id. Ultimately, this investigative technique was declared constitutional because it had been 
authorized by a valid warrant.  See id. at *4.   
 121. See id. at *2. 
 122. See also United States v. Orbegoso, 2013 WL 161194 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2013) (describing an 
investigation where law enforcement employed both surreptitiously installed GPS tracking devices and 
cell phone tracking). 
 123. United States v. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010).  Moreover, as 
Justice Alito notes in Jones, “phone-location-tracking services are offered as ‘social’ tools, allowing 
consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in these services.”  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 124. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008).  See 
also In re Applications of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D. Mass. 2007) (“[C]ell site 
information coupled with a basic knowledge of trigonometry makes it possible to identify with 
reasonable certainty the location from which a call was made.”). 
 125. See United States v. Hardrick, 2012 WL 4883666, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2012) (noting that 
“the more cell-site tower locations in a given area, the more precise the location information can be for a 
user’s particular call” and that “densely populated regions are equipped with more cell-site towers”). 
 126. As one court has noted, cell towers can be up to ten or more miles apart in rural areas and 
may be up to a half-mile or more apart even in urban areas. See In re Application of the United States, 
405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).   
 127. See In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If a 
user’s cell phone has communicated with a particular cell-site, this strongly suggests that the user has 
physically been within the particular cell-site’s geographical range.  By technical and practical 
necessity, cell-phone service providers keep historical records of which cell-sites each of their users’ 
cell phones have communicated.  The implication of these facts is that cellular service providers have 
records of the geographic location of almost every American at almost every time of day and night.”). 
 128. Rothstein, supra note 116, at 494. 
 129. See In re Application of the United States, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437 (“As a cell phone user 
moves from place to place, the cell phone automatically switches to the tower that provides the best 
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site information, law enforcement may request all such data 
accumulated over a period of time in the past; by contrast, with real-time 
data, law enforcement may seek to obtain this information on a real-time 
basis into the future.130  The tracking of a cell phone in this manner does 
not require the installation of any device, hence no trespass; rather, the 
phone itself does the work.131  
As technology evolves, cell site location information is becoming just 
as accurate, and in some instances even more so, than alternative forms 
of GPS tracking, a development that supports my proposal to treat all 
forms of electronic monitoring alike for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.  This evolution has two primary causes.  First, due to the 
massive increase in the use of data by cell phone users in recent years 
(AT&T, for example, experienced an 8,000 percent increase in data 
traffic from 2007 to 2010),132 carriers have been forced to deploy new 
cell sites and reduce the coverage area of existing cell towers, which, in 
turn, makes cell site data more accurate.133  Second, new technologies—
including microcell, picocell, and femtocell technology134—have the 
potential to make cell site location information more accurate than GPS.  
Because these technologies often broadcast a signal no farther than a 
subscriber’s home, single cell site location data can in some cases be 
more accurate than GPS.135  For example, in urban areas where 
microcell technology is used, a cell phone’s location can be identified on 
an individual floor or room within a building.136  
In striking down the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device in 
Jones, the majority based its decision on the physical trespass that was 
required to monitor the vehicle’s movements.137  Jones did not address 
the constitutionality of obtaining similar tracking information in the 
absence of a trespass, including location information obtained directly 
 
reception,” which in turn enables the Government to obtain “cell-site information concerning the 
physical location of the antenna towers associated with the beginning and termination of calls to and 
from a particular cellphone.”).  See also id. at 447 (noting the distinction between requests for 
“historical versus real time data”). 
 130. See United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 131. In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 81 n.11. 
 132. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 132.  
 133. Id. at 132–33. 
 134. For a description of this technology, see id. at 132. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. at 137. 
 137. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951. Crucial to the majority’s analysis is the fact that 
“Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device.”  Id. 
at 952. 
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from a suspect’s cell phone provider.138  According to Jones, the 
constitutionality of non-trespassory forms of GPS tracking, like cell 
phone tracking, would be governed by Katz.   
Under the Katz framework, obtaining tracking information directly 
from a third-party provider is arguably not a “search” under the 
Supreme Court’s assumption of risk rationale, which posits that one 
cannot reasonably expect privacy in certain types of “addressing 
information” knowingly disclosed to a third party,139 such as a telephone 
company.140  Indeed, many courts have likened this form of evidence to 
company business records, which are generally unprotected by the 
Fourth Amendment.141  If this rationale is applied to instances of cell 
phone tracking, this method of investigation would fall outside the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections altogether, regardless of the volume of 
data requested or the length of surveillance.   
United States v. Graham,142 decided just a few weeks after Jones, 
illustrates the potential application of the assumption of risk rationale to 
the warrantless gathering of historical cell site location information 
(CSLI).  In Graham, a federal District Court ruled that the government 
does not need probable cause or a warrant to obtain more than seven 
months of CSLI from a cell phone provider.143  In that case, two 
defendants were thought to have conducted a series of armed robberies, 
and a key piece of evidence linking them to each robbery was data about 
the movements of their cell phones.144  The defendants sought to 
 
 138. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  See also People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 442 
(2009) (“[W]ith GPS becoming an increasingly routine feature in cars and cell phones, it will be 
possible to tell from the technology with ever increasing precision who we are and are not with, when 
we are and are not with them, and what we do and do not carry on our persons—to mention just a few of 
the highly feasible empirical configurations.”). 
 139. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979) (distinguishing the content of 
communications, which are protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the addressing information 
associated with those communications, which are not, and reasoning: “[t]elephone users . . . typically 
know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has 
facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information 
for a variety of legitimate business purposes. . . .  [I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, 
under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain 
secret.”). 
 140. The government advanced this argument in United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 
(D. Md. 2012), a case decided less than two months after Jones. See id. at 388. 
 141. See, e.g., id. at 398 (“Like the bank records at issue in Miller [which are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment], the historical cell site location records in this case are not the ‘private papers’ of 
the Defendants—instead, they are the ‘business records’ of the cellular providers . . . and are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 394–95. 
 144. On March 25, 2011, the government applied for an order from a magistrate judge pursuant to 
the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, “which ordered Sprint/Nextel, Inc. to 
disclose to the government ‘the identification and address of cellular towers (cell site locations) related 
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suppress this evidence because the government did not obtain a warrant 
authorizing its acquisition.145  Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the 
court ruled that the defendants “[lacked] a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the 
government.”146  According to the court, “[l]ike the dialed telephone 
numbers in Smith, the [d]efendants in this case voluntarily transmitted 
signals to cellular towers in order for their calls to be connected,”147 and 
“[t]he cellular provider then created internal records of that data for its 
own business purposes.”148   
In reaching this result, the Graham court described Jones as “relevant 
but not controlling in this case.”149  The court distinguished Jones on the 
grounds that historical cell site location data exposes only historical 
evidence of a suspect’s past locations,150 whereas GPS technology 
reveals the location and movements of a suspect in real time and is “far 
more precise than the historical cell site location data at issue here.”151   
Like Graham, a majority of courts to have considered the 
constitutionality of acquiring historical cell site location information 
have invoked Smith’s assumption of risk rationale, effectively 
eliminating Fourth Amendment protection, regardless of the volume of 
 
to the use of the [Defendants’ cellular telephones].”  Id. at 386.  The government sought cell site 
location data for the periods of August 10–15, 2010; September 18–20, 2010; January 21–23, 2011; and 
February 4–5, 2011.  Id.  In its application, the government alleged that the information sought was 
relevant to an ongoing investigation of robberies the defendants were suspected of committing.  Id.  “By 
identifying the location of cellular towers accessed by the defendants’ phones during the relevant time 
periods, the government sought to more conclusively link the defendants with the prior robberies.”  Id.  
The magistrate judge issued the order under the reasonable suspicion standard utilized by the Stored 
Communications Act.  Id.  In a second order, the Government sought cell site location data for the 
periods July 1, 2010 through February 6, 2011.  This order was granted by a separate magistrate judge 
under the same reasonable suspicion standard.  Id.  The government’s request resulted in the release of 
almost 22,000 individual cell site location data points.  Id. at 387.   
 145. Id.  The Graham defendants did not argue that the Stored Communications Act is 
unconstitutional on its face, but instead argued that the length of time and extent of the cellular phone 
monitoring conducted in their particular case intruded on their expectation of privacy and was therefore 
unconstitutional.  Id.  
 146. Id. at 389. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. See also id. at 399 (“Like the bank records at issue in Miller, [and] the telephone numbers 
dialed in Smith . . . , historical cell site location records are records created and kept by third parties that 
are voluntarily conveyed to those third parties by their customers.  As part of the ordinary course of 
business, cellular phone companies collect information that identifies the cellular towers through which 
a person’s calls are routed.”). 
 149. Id. at 406 n.2.   
 150. While this may be a plausible distinction of Jones, the distinction would not apply in those 
instances in which the government seeks “real time” cell site information.  See In re Application of the 
United States, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting the distinction between requests for 
“historical versus real time data”). 
 151. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392.  
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information obtained.152  However, not all courts have chosen to follow 
Graham’s approach, especially for larger volumes of data acquired over 
lengthier periods of time.153   
Given the concurring Justices’ opinions in Jones, this complex issue 
should not be resolved by such a simple application of the assumption of 
risk doctrine, especially when one considers the inability of that doctrine 
to account for the realities of the digital age.154  Cell site location 
information enables the Government to obtain nearly the same type and 
volume of location information provided by the surreptitiously-installed 
GPS device utilized in Jones, especially if a suspect is a frequent phone 
user, thereby implicating the very concerns of the five Justices who 
concurred in Jones regarding the aggregation of various bits of private 
information.155  According to Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”156 all highly 
private and intimate matters.157  Moreover, the longer that an individual 
is tracked by GPS, the more data that can be accumulated, naturally 
 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 1:10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 
27, 2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. CR 08-0730 WHA, 2010 WL 4286276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
22, 2010); United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 
2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8–11 
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re Applications of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80–81 (D. Mass. 
2007).   
 153. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118–19 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“Here, the Government has requested . . . at least 113 days of constant surveillance of an 
individual. . . .  [T]he application seeks information that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. . . .  The 
cell-site-location records sought here captures enough of the user’s location information for a long 
enough time period—significantly longer than the four weeks in Maynard—to depict a sufficiently 
detailed and intimate picture of his movements to trigger the same constitutional concerns as the GPS 
data in Maynard.”). 
 154. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with Justice Alito that long-term GPS monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy” with 
or without a physical intrusion, and noting that individuals often have no choice but to reveal private 
information to third parties (e.g., calls and texts to and from cell phones, internet browsing history) and 
yet still would be offended by government monitoring of the very same data).  See also McAllister, 
supra note 29, at 520–21 (2012). 
 155. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing her concern that, “[w]ith 
increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this 
case by enlisting . . . GPS-enabled smartphones”).  Perhaps the primary factor noted by the concurring 
Justices in Jones was the length of surveillance.  See id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (“the Court’s 
reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term 
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor 
(attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s 
operation)”).  See also In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19. 
 156. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
 157. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing “GPS monitoring” as “making available at a 
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
Government . . . chooses to track”). 
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leading to a greater invasion of privacy.158  These concerns apply to both 
GPS tracking in the manner employed in Jones and GPS tracking 
accomplished via cell phone.  In her Jones opinion, Justice Sotomayor 
further reasoned, “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching 
chills associational and expressive freedoms.”159  Again, this is true of 
both GPS tracking in the manner employed in Jones and GPS tracking 
accomplished via cell phone—perhaps even more so with respect to cell 
phone tracking given the inherently tighter connection between a 
person’s phone and her First Amendment rights.  Finally, in neither case 
does the suspect know his location is being tracked by government 
agents.160  With very little difference between the types of information 
provided by both forms of investigation, and very little difference in the 
manner in which the information is conveyed to police, acquisition of 
this type of information should be more carefully analyzed by taking 
into account the opinions of the Jones concurring Justices.161 
In cases that have rejected or failed to employ the assumption of risk 
doctrine, leading to a more precise Katz-based analysis, courts have 
begun to draw lines based upon the factors noted by Justice Alito—most 
notably, the length of surveillance.  Employing Katz, several post-Jones 
courts have ruled that tracking a suspect for only a few days, whether 
through cell phone tracking or through more traditional forms of GPS 
tracking, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search.” 
For example, in United States v. Skinner,162 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined whether the tracking of a cell 
phone for three days constituted a “search” under Katz.  In that case, 
DEA agents discovered a large-scale drug-trafficking operation after 
arresting one of its participants, Christopher Shearer, who then divulged 
information about the scheme.163  According to Shearer, the operation’s 
marijuana supplier, Philip Apodaca, used couriers to send marijuana 
from his home in Arizona to another participant, James Michael West, 
in Tennessee.164  The defendant, Melvin Skinner, was one of those 
couriers.  Agents also learned from Shearer that Apodaca purchased 
 
 158. According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he Government can store such records and efficiently 
mine them for information years into the future.”  Id. at 955. 
 159. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
 160. Rothstein, supra note 116, at 495 (2012) (noting that judicial orders authorizing cell phone 
tracking are usually accompanied by a gag order preventing the service provider from notifying 
consumers that the government is accessing their location information, and that associated records are 
usually placed under indefinite seal). 
 161. See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text.  As the Jones majority noted, the 
inside/outside distinction between Knotts and Karo is also potentially relevant here.  See supra notes 
59–63 and accompanying text. 
 162. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 163. Id. at 775. 
 164. Id. 
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pay-as-you-go cell phones that he programmed with contact information 
and then gave to the couriers to maintain communication.  Apodaca was 
unaware that these phones were equipped with GPS technology.165 
In late June 2006, agents learned that Skinner would meet Apodaca in 
Arizona on July 11 to pick up approximately 900 pounds of marijuana 
for transport to Tennessee on July 13.166  In the meantime, agents 
obtained an order from a magistrate judge on July 12 authorizing the 
phone company to release subscriber information, cell site information, 
GPS real-time location, and “ping” data for the cell phone thought to be 
used by Skinner.  That same day, agents “pinged” this particular cell 
phone and discovered that it was then located near West’s primary 
residence.167  Agents subsequently determined that West, rather than 
Skinner, was using this particular phone.   
Agents then obtained a second judicial order authorizing release of 
the same information for the phone actually being used by Skinner, 
which revealed that the phone was located near Flagstaff, Arizona.168  
By continuously “pinging” the second phone, authorities learned that 
Skinner left Arizona on July 14 and was traveling across Texas.  At no 
point did agents follow the vehicle or conduct any type of visual 
surveillance.169   
At around 2:00 a.m. on July 16, the GPS indicated that Skinner’s 
phone had stopped near Abilene, Texas.  DEA agents in that area were 
then dispatched to a nearby truck stop, where they discovered Skinner’s 
vehicle.  After a dog sniff alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers 
searched the vehicle and discovered over 1,100 pounds of marijuana.170 
Prior to trial, Skinner sought to suppress the evidence obtained from 
his vehicle, arguing that the agents’ use of GPS location information 
emitted from his cell phone was a warrantless search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment.171  The trial court, however, denied his motion.172  
In affirming that decision, the Sixth Circuit analogized the case to 
Knotts and distinguished it from Jones.   
 
 165. Id. After some time, the drug conspirators would discard their pay-as-you-go phones and get 
new ones with different telephone numbers and fictitious names. Id.  
 166. Id. at 775–76. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. Skinner was subsequently charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute in excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 
841(b)(1)(A), conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and aiding 
and abetting the attempt to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at 777 (describing the lower court proceedings). 
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According to the Skinner court, as in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on 
public roads throughout his journey.173  As such, “[w]hile the cell site 
information aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that 
same information could have been obtained through visual surveillance” 
along Skinner’s public route.174   
In distinguishing Jones, the Skinner court first reasoned that, unlike in 
Jones where police physically intruded upon a constitutionally-protected 
area by attaching the GPS tracking device to Jones’s vehicle, “[n]o such 
physical intrusion occurred in [this] case.”175  Rather, 
“Skinner[’s] . . . phone included the GPS technology used to track the 
phone’s whereabouts,” thereby rendering the Jones majority’s trespass 
concerns inapplicable.176   
Responding to Justice Alito’s concerns regarding the comprehensive 
tracking of a suspect’s movements, the Skinner court further declared 
that “[n]o such extreme comprehensive tracking is present . . . [where] 
the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s cell phone for three days.”177  
According to the court, such “relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of 
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”178  This is 
because, as the court declared, “the monitoring of the . . . vehicle as it 
crossed the country is no more of a comprehensively invasive search 
than if instead the car was identified in Arizona and then tracked 
visually, and the search handed off from one local authority to another 
as the vehicles progressed,”179 thereby eliminating any expectation of 
privacy Skinner may have had in his location.180   
In State v. Estrella,181 a case similar to Jones, in that agents 
trespassorily attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle, the 
Court of Appeals of Arizona deemed any trespass-based argument from 
Jones to have been waived and therefore analyzed the issue under 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 779–80. 
 176. Id. at 780.  Later, invoking the Jones Court’s discussion of Karo, the Skinner court reasoned, 
“the Government never had physical contact with Skinner’s cell phone; he obtained it, GPS technology 
and all, and could not object to its presence.”  Id. at 781. 
 177. Id. at 780. 
 178. Id. (citations omitted). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 781.  The court declared that no Fourth Amendment violation would have occurred 
even if the agents had not obtained court orders authorizing the GPS tracking of Skinner’s cell phone. 
See id. at 779 (“Although not necessary to find that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this 
case, the Government’s argument is strengthened by the fact that the authorities sought court orders to 
obtain information on Skinner’s location from the GPS capabilities of his cell phone.”). 
 181. State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
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Katz.182  In Estrella, DEA agents, acting without a warrant, placed a 
GPS tracking device on a van after discovering that the van was being 
used to transport illegal drugs.183  Similar to Jones, agents attached the 
device while the van was parked in a public parking lot.184  Also similar 
to Jones, agents then used the device to monitor the van’s 
movements.185   
After the GPS device indicated the van was traveling in a direction 
that corresponded with allegations of illegal drug distribution, agents 
then contacted Arizona state police and informed them that the van 
might be transporting marijuana.186  In response, Arizona police located 
the van and pulled it over.187  Upon discovering that the driver, 
defendant Estrella, had an outstanding arrest warrant, agents arrested 
Estrella and searched the van, which yielded bundles of marijuana.188 
Estrella later moved to suppress the marijuana, alleging that the 
warrantless placement and use of the GPS device violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.189  The trial court, however, denied the motion.190  
On appeal,191 the court found Estrella to have waived any argument 
under the trespass theory espoused in Jones192 and instead addressed 
whether Estrella could assert a successful Katz claim.193   
In rejecting Estrella’s claim, the court presented two, intertwined 
rationales.194  Most importantly, the court declared that, “generally ‘[a] 
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,’”195 and that “[t]his is true particularly where the government’s 
monitoring is short-term.”196  Given the limited use of the GPS device, 
 
 182. Id. at 152–53. 
 183. Id. at 151. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 151–52. 
 190. Estrella was later convicted.  Id. at 152. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 152–53. 
 193. Id. at 153. 
 194. The first rationale was based on the defendant’s lack of standing.  According to the court, 
“Estrella provided no evidence he had permission to drive the van or otherwise had any interest in it 
when the device was attached to the vehicle in a public parking lot,” presumably defeating his claim to 
an expectation of privacy in that vehicle.  Id. at 154.  
 195. Id. at 153 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
 196. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (short-
term monitoring of person’s movements in public “accords with expectations of privacy that our society 
has recognized as reasonable”)).  According to the court, this is particularly true where “the driver has 
borrowed another’s vehicle without any knowledge of whether it is being tracked by a GPS device” 
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the court refused to address “the hypothetical situation Justice 
Sotomayor’s observation suggests, in which GPS tracking is used to 
aggregate large amounts of personal data for a much longer period of 
time, or on a purely arbitrary basis.”197   
In a similar case, United States v. Luna-Santillanes,198 where agents 
installed multiple GPS tracking devices on vehicles driven by three 
suspects,199 the court rejected Jones’s trespass approach and held that a 
one-day track of a suspect’s vehicle was not a “search” under Katz.  In 
the relevant portion of the opinion, the court analyzed whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when police attached a GPS tracking 
device to a red Lincoln Aviator and used that device to monitor the 
Aviator’s movements for one day.200  According to the court, the two 
defendants who objected to this monitoring, neither of whom were 
present at the time the Aviator was searched, did not have standing to 
object to that action,201 making Jones’s trespass rationale 
inapplicable.202   
Next, and more significantly, the court applied the Katz test and 
concluded that “even if Defendants could establish that they had 
standing to challenge the . . . search and seizure of the red Lincoln 
Aviator, the one-day monitoring of that vehicle” was not a Fourth 
 
because “[f]rom the reasonable borrower’s perspective, it is entirely possible the owner has permitted 
the installation of such a device.”  Id. at 153–54. 
 197. Id. at 154.  According to the court, “[t]he determination of whether that type of surveillance 
may intrude on a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy, and accordingly run afoul of 
constitutional standards, must wait until the issue is presented.”  Id. 
 198. United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 
2012). 
 199. See id. at *2–3 (describing the warrantless attachment and subsequent monitoring of GPS 
tracking devices to three vehicles being driven by defendants, a red Lincoln Aviator, a silver Chrysler 
Sebring, and a black Mazda). 
 200. According to the facts as described by the Luna-Santillanes court, DEA agents installed a 
GPS device on the red Lincoln Aviator on April 13, 2011.  See id. at *2.  On April 14, 2011, DEA 
agents used the GPS device on the Aviator to monitor its movements, through which agents were able to 
determine that the Aviator had traveled to Chicago and was on its way back to the Detroit area.  At that 
point, DEA agents requested assistance by the Michigan State Police to conduct a traffic stop of the 
Aviator.  Id.  Once the vehicle was stopped, the driver and sole occupant consented to a search of the 
vehicle, which produced two kilograms of heroin.  Id.  After this search, the GPS tracking device was 
removed within hours, id. at *7, such that the GPS device was on the Aviator “for two days at the most.”  
Id. at *7 n.4. 
 201. Id. at *6.  According to the court, unlike the defendant in Jones, neither defendant at issue 
could establish that they were the “exclusive driver” of the vehicle, and the vehicle was not registered to 
either defendant.  Id. 
 202. See id. at *6 (reasoning that, due to the lack of standing in the vehicle at issue, “unlike the 
defendant in Jones, D-1 and D-2 cannot persuasively argue that ‘[t]he Government usurped [their] 
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on [them], thereby invading privacy interests long 
afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.’”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
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Amendment violation.203  With little discussion of this issue, the court 
simply reasoned that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that 
our society has recognized as reasonable.”204 
As Skinner, Estrella, and Luna-Santillanes make clear, tracking a 
suspect’s vehicle by GPS for only a few days likely does not constitute a 
“search” under a Katz-based analysis.  Thus, while the opinions of the 
five concurring Justices in Jones indicate that a suspect similar to 
Antoine Jones can reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public 
where those movements are tracked for twenty-eight days or longer, 
these more recent decisions indicate that a person traveling on public 
roads over a few days cannot reasonably expect privacy in those 
movements.  Exactly where the line of protection begins between these 
two points remains unclear.  
IV. SURVEY RESULTS 
As recent GPS tracking cases illustrate, tracking a suspect by GPS for 
only a few days likely does not constitute a “search” under the Katz test, 
an approach that seemingly complies with Justice Alito’s opinion in 
Jones.  However, tracking a suspect for a lengthier period of time likely 
does constitute a “search” under the Katz test.  As Justice Alito noted in 
Jones, however, the result in such cases might depend on the actual 
crime under investigation.205  In the months following Jones, I 
administered two surveys designed to test Justice Alito’s suggestion.  I 
designed each survey with the help of an instructional design consultant, 
who ensured the validity of each survey instrument.206  This section sets 
forth the detailed results of each of these surveys.   
A. Overall Survey Design 
A court analyzing a “search” issue under Katz must consider whether 
“society is prepared to recognize [a defendant’s asserted expectation of 
privacy] as reasonable.”207  Taken literally, the Katz inquiry anticipates 
at least some assessment of society’s actual expectations of privacy, as 
 
 203. United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 
26, 2012). 
 204. Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 205. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 206. See supra note 30.  
 207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
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opposed to an analysis that entirely disregards society’s views.208   
According to Fourth Amendment scholar Christopher Slobogin, there 
are at least two ways to determine societal attitudes about privacy.  The 
first is to examine property, contract, and tort doctrine for clues as to 
what society believes is private.209  For example, in the context of GPS 
tracking, the California legislature has made it unlawful for private 
citizens to “use an electronic tracking device to determine the location 
or movement of a person” and has specifically declared that “electronic 
tracking of a person’s location without that person’s knowledge violates 
that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”210   
A second method is to simply pose the question to society.211  This 
form of empirical analysis is gaining acceptance among legal scholars, 
particularly under the Fourth Amendment, where scholars have 
employed the empirical approach to analyze various Fourth Amendment 
“search” issues.212  My surveys follow in the footsteps of similar 
surveys conducted by Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher. 
In 1993, Slobogin and Schumacher conducted a survey, completed by 
217 individuals, which included fifty scenarios involving various forms 
of police investigation.213  Several years later, Slobogin conducted a 
second survey, completed by 190 people, which contained twenty police 
investigation scenarios.214   
In each of these studies, the subjects were asked to rate each 
investigative method in terms of “intrusiveness” on a scale of 1 to 100, 
with 1 representing “not intrusive” and 100 representing “very 
 
 208. Scholars agree. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 33 (University of Chicago Press 2007) 
(arguing that “some assessment of societal attitudes about the relative intrusiveness of police actions 
should inform the analysis” under Katz and noting that “the Court has pretty much ignored this precept, 
with predictably anomalous results”); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1000 
(2007) (“I part with the High Court . . . on its refusal to determine those expectations [of privacy] in any 
rational manner.  Rather than grapple with the complications of surveys or other evidence, the Court has 
been content to declare societal expectations without any foundation or support. . . .  Either courts 
should look to academic empirical studies like those done by Professor Slobogin (in which case we need 
more like them), or litigants should prepare relevant surveys” of their own.). 
 209. SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 33. 
 210. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7.  Other states have enacted similar legislation.  See, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5; MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35; FLA. STAT. 
§ 934.42; S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140; OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-
42, 803-44.7; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761. 
 211. SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 33. 
 212. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 112, 184 (tables reporting empirical data). 
 213. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993). 
 214. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 110–11 (describing survey design).   
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intrusive.”215  Slobogin and Schumacher hypothesized that “many of the 
Court’s conclusions about expectations of privacy and autonomy do not 
correlate with actual understandings of innocent members of society.”216  
As Slobogin and Schumacher demonstrated, judicial conclusions about 
expectations of privacy do not always correlate with actual expectations 
of privacy among society.217   
My surveys are similar to the Slobogin and Schumacher surveys but 
contain key differences.218  Most significantly, unlike the Slobogin and 
Schumacher surveys, in which survey participants were instructed to 
numerically assess the extent to which they considered each method “an 
invasion of privacy or autonomy,”219 my surveys simply ask 
respondents to indicate whether they believe police should have to 
obtain a search warrant before undertaking each type of activity 
identified by the survey instrument.  Thus, my survey employs a simple 
“yes” or “no” option, rather than a 100-point scale of invasiveness.220  
This binary method more closely follows the analysis required by Katz, 
which effectively requires a reviewing court to determine whether 
society does, or does not, expect privacy in the particular case at hand. 
B. GPS Tracking Survey 
My first survey focuses exclusively on GPS tracking of the type that 
occurred in Jones—i.e., where officers surreptitiously attach a GPS 
tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle and subsequently use that device 
to monitor the vehicle’s movements for a period of time.  This survey 
poses a series of questions involving GPS tracking of seven different 
types of suspects, including: individuals not suspected of any crime, 
 
 215. Id. at 111.  See also Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 213, at 735–36.  According to 
Slobogin and Schumacher, “[w]ith respect to searches, we wanted to discover [society’s] expectations of 
privacy in the searched area.”  Id. at 733.  To uncover those expectations, Slobogin and Schumacher 
sought evidence regarding “how society perceives the ‘intrusiveness’ of government investigative 
methods.”  Id.  According to the researchers, “[u]sing the single word ‘intrusiveness’ is less 
cumbersome than speaking about the impact of government conduct on reasonable expectations of 
privacy . . . .  At the same time, ‘intrusiveness’ captures the core of the construct we sought to 
investigate . . . .”  Id. 
 216. Id. at 733–34. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Among other differences, my survey examines particular “search” issues not examined by 
Slobogin and Schumacher.  For example, my survey includes questions relating to police access of 
computer files and records, including the issues presented in United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 
(9th Cir. 2007), ones not included in Slobogin’s surveys.   
 219. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 213, at 735–36. 
 220. Note, however, that the GPS tracking questions contain three overall options as to whether 
GPS tracking should be allowed in the absence of a warrant: (1) “Yes, indefinitely,” (2) “No,” and (3) 
“Yes, but only for a limited time.”  If a respondent selects choice (3), she is then presented with an 
additional question asking her to specify the acceptable length of warrantless tracking.   
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individuals suspected of minor crimes, and individuals suspected of 
relatively more severe crimes.   
This survey considered the following suspects: (1) a person who has 
not been convicted of a previous crime and who is currently not 
suspected of committing any crime (i.e., an “innocent suspect”); (2) a 
person who has not been convicted of a previous crime but who is 
currently suspected of having committed an unspecified crime; (3) a 
person who is a convicted felon, but who is not currently suspected of 
committing another crime; (4) a person who is a convicted felon, and 
who is currently suspected of committing another, unspecified crime; (5) 
a suspected terrorist; (6) a suspected drug dealer; and (7) a suspected 
serial killer.   
Tracking Justice Alito’s suggestion in Jones, which highlights the 
type of crime under investigation and the length of surveillance as 
potential factors under Katz, my first hypothesis was that society would 
generally believe that Fourth Amendment protections should vary based 
upon the nature of the crime under investigation.  Examining the other 
factor noted by Justice Alito, I further hypothesized that most people 
would be willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon the 
length of surveillance.  Combining the two, my basic hypothesis was 
that society would agree that Fourth Amendment protections should 
vary based upon the nature of the crime under investigation, and most 
people would permit police to engage in warrantless GPS tracking for a 
longer period of time when investigating the most serious offenses.   
1. Variations Based on the Type of Suspect 
After collecting over 230 survey responses, I was able to verify my 
first hypothesis.  For example, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of 
230), would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the 
vehicle of an innocent suspect221 and monitor that vehicle’s movements 
without first obtaining a warrant.  By contrast, when asked whether 
police should be permitted to monitor a suspected drug dealer’s222 
vehicle by way of surreptitiously installed GPS, nearly half of all survey 
respondents, 47.1%, would have permitted this individual to be tracked 
without a warrant.223  Finally, when asked the same question regarding 
the tracking of a suspected terrorist, 67.3% of survey respondents would 
 
 221. As used here, the term “innocent suspect” refers to an individual who has not previously 
been convicted of a crime and who is not currently suspected of committing any crime. 
 222. Among the seven different types of suspects hypothesized by my survey, the suspected drug 
dealer represents the type of suspect that most closely approximates the suspect in Jones. 
 223. On this question, 20.6% of survey respondents would have permitted warrantless GPS 
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer. 
32
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/5
2013] GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING 239 
have permitted warrantless tracking.224   
These trends were observed across all seven different types of 
suspects identified in this survey.  Examining the seven suspect types, 
three distinct groups of suspects emerge.  Group One includes innocent 
suspects who are not suspected of committing any crime, which 
encompasses Suspect Types 1 and 3.  Group Two includes individuals 
who are either suspected of committing a minor crime or whose 
suspected crime was left unspecified, including Suspect Types 2, 4, and 
6.  Group Three includes suspects who are suspected of committing a 
severe crime, Suspect Types 5 and 7. 
Group One includes the suspects who were presumed to be innocent.  
For Suspect Type 1, the innocent suspect not suspected of committing a 
crime, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of 230), would have 
permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the vehicle of this 
particular suspect and monitor that vehicle’s movements without first 
obtaining a warrant.  Similarly, for Suspect Type 3, the convicted felon 
who is not currently suspected of committing a crime, only 26.3% of 
survey respondents (60 of 228), would have permitted police to attach a 
GPS tracking device to this particular suspect’s vehicle and monitor that 
vehicle’s movements without first obtaining a warrant.  Given these 
small percentages, society appears generally unwilling to permit 
warrantless GPS tracking of an innocent suspect.   
By contrast, when we examine the results of the Group Three 
suspects, those suspected of committing a severe crime, society’s views 
appear to flip.  For Suspect Type 5, the suspected terrorist, 67.3% of 
survey respondents (152 of 226) would have permitted this individual to 
be tracked without a warrant.225  Likewise, for Suspect Type 7, the 
suspected serial killer, 64.8% of survey respondents (142 of 219) would 
have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant.   
The Group Two suspects are in the middle, and they include those 
individuals who are either suspected of committing a minor crime or 
whose suspected crime was left unspecified: Suspect Types 2, 4, and 6. 
For Suspect Type 2, a person who has not been convicted of a 
previous crime but who is currently suspected of having committed an 
unspecified crime, only 45.6% of survey respondents (103 of 226) 
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant, 
whereas 54.4% of respondents (123 of 226) would have required a 
 
 224. Of those respondents who would have permitted the tracking of a suspected terrorist in the 
absence of a warrant, 89 of 226 respondents, or 39.4%, would have permitted such an individual to be 
tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.   
 225. Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of respondents (90 of 226), would have permitted the 
suspected terrorist to be tracked without a warrant for a relatively lengthy period of time—i.e., twenty-
one days or longer. 
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search warrant authorizing such tracking.   
For Suspect Type 4, a person who is a convicted felon and currently 
suspected of committing an unspecified crime, 68.0% of survey 
respondents (153 of 225) would have permitted this individual to be 
tracked without a warrant, whereas only 32.0% of respondents (72 of 
225) would have required a search warrant to do so.   
Finally, for Suspect Type 6, a suspected drug dealer, 47.1% of survey 
respondents (105 of 223) would have permitted this individual to be 
tracked without a warrant, whereas 52.9% (118 of 223) believed police 
should have to obtain a warrant.  Notably, for the suspected drug dealer, 
only about 1 in 5 respondents would have permitted warrantless GPS 
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer, a result which lends strong 
empirical support for the Court’s holding in Jones, where the Court 
unanimously invalidated the tracking of a suspected drug dealer for 
twenty-eight days without a valid warrant.226 
2. Variations on the Permissible Length of Surveillance 
Regarding the permissible length of warrantless GPS tracking, the 
results of the first survey appeared to verify my second hypothesis that 
society would be willing to allow warrantless GPS tracking for a longer 
period of time when investigating the most serious offenses.   
Beginning with the Group One suspects, society appeared unwilling 
to permit warrantless GPS tracking of an innocent suspect for any period 
of time.  For Suspect Type 1, the innocent suspect not suspected of 
committing a crime, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of 230), 
would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the 
vehicle of this particular suspect and monitor that vehicle’s movements 
without first obtaining a warrant.  Of those 25 individuals, 22 of them 
would have permitted warrantless GPS tracking for only a few days.227  
Across all 230 respondents, only three would have permitted this 
individual to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.   
 
 226. Here, only 46 of the 223 respondents, or 20.6%, would permit warrantless GPS tracking to 
extend twenty-one days or longer.  Given that only 1 in 5 respondents would permit warrantless GPS 
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer for a suspect similar to Antoine Jones, the Government’s 
analogy to visual observation of a vehicle in public, as argued in Jones, a case involving a twenty-eight 
day warrantless GPS tracking, simply fails to adequately resolve the issue.  In its Jones brief, the United 
States argued that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information knowingly 
exposed to public view, which directly applied to Jones.  See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18, 38, 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5094951. 
 227. Four of these 22 survey respondents selected “less than 1 day” as the length of time police 
would be permitted to track this individual without a warrant; 3 selected one day, 1 selected two days; 9 
selected 3–5 days; 5 selected 6–10 days; and no respondents selected 11–20 days.  Accordingly, of these 
22 respondents, 8 would have permitted such warrantless tracking for only two days or less; and 9 
would have allowed such tracking to extend 3–5 days without a warrant. 
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Similar results appear for Suspect Type 3, the convicted felon who is 
not currently suspected of committing a crime.  Here, only 26.3% of 
survey respondents (60 of 228), would have permitted police to attach a 
GPS tracking device to the vehicle of this particular suspect and monitor 
that vehicle’s movements without a warrant.  Of the 60 respondents who 
would permit warrantless tracking, 10 selected either “less than 1 day” 
or “1 day” as the permissible length of surveillance; eight selected “3–5 
days”; nine selected “6–10 days”; and 32 would have permitted 
warrantless tracking for twenty-one days or longer.228   
Although society seems willing to permit a convicted felon (who is 
not currently suspected of committing a crime) to be tracked for a 
lengthier period of time than the innocent suspect, the overriding 
sentiment is that police should never be permitted to attach a GPS 
tracking device to the vehicle of an innocent suspect and monitor that 
vehicle’s movements in the absence of a warrant.   
By contrast, when we examine the results of the Group Three 
suspects, those suspected of committing a severe crime, society appears 
generally willing to permit warrantless GPS tracking.  For Suspect Type 
5, the suspected terrorist, 67.3% of survey respondents (152 of 226) 
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant, 
whereas only 32.7% of respondents (74 of 226) would have required a 
warrant to do so.  Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of respondents 
(90 of 226), would have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked 
without a warrant for a relatively lengthy period of time—i.e., twenty-
one days or longer.  Nearly half of all respondents (107 of 226) would 
have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked without a warrant for 
eleven days or longer, and a majority of all respondents (124 of 226) 
would have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked without a 
warrant for six days or longer.   
Similar results appear for Suspect Type 7, the suspected serial killer.  
For the suspected serial killer, 64.8% of survey respondents (142 of 219) 
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant, 
whereas only 35.2% of respondents (77 of 219) would have required a 
search warrant to do so.  Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of all 
respondents (86 of 219), would have permitted the suspected serial killer 
to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer, and 
almost 50% of respondents (109 of 219) would have permitted the 
suspected serial killer to be tracked without a warrant for six days or 
longer.   
As a whole, these results suggest that society is willing to permit law 
enforcement to track by GPS those suspected of the most extreme 
 
 228. The remaining respondent selected “11–20 days” as the permissible length of surveillance. 
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crimes for at least several days without prior judicial approval.  When 
compared to the innocent suspects, society seemingly agrees that police 
should have greater freedom to investigate the most serious offenses by 
way of GPS.   
C. Cell Phone Tracking Survey 
To further refine my research, I conducted a second survey posing a 
similar set of questions relating to both GPS tracking by way of physical 
trespass, approximating the issue in Jones; and GPS tracking 
accomplished in the absence of a physical trespass by way of a GPS-
enabled smart phone, an issue that currently remains unresolved.  This 
second survey sought to determine whether society meaningfully 
distinguishes between these two methods of tracking.  To determine 
whether a trespass upon an effect should, or should not, be dispositive, 
this survey seeks to determine whether society expects the same, more, 
or less privacy in the tracking of cell phones, which are presumably 
known to contain GPS devices upon purchase, vis-à-vis tracking by way 
of GPS device surreptitiously attached to a suspect’s vehicle.   
In this second survey, respondents were given two series of questions.  
In the first series of questions, respondents were asked to assume that 
police had attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle by way 
of trespass and had used that device to monitor the suspect’s movements 
for a period of time (as in Jones).  In the second series of questions, 
identical to the first in most respects,229 respondents were instead asked 
to assume that police were able to monitor an individual’s movements 
by obtaining location information directly from the suspect’s cell phone 
provider.   
This second survey had only two basic questions.  First, the survey 
asked whether police should be required to obtain a search warrant 
before they may attach a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle and 
subsequently monitor that vehicle’s movements.  Second, the survey 
asked whether police should be required to obtain a search warrant in 
 
 229. Emphasizing the parallel to GPS tracking, the lead-in language for the second series of 
questions was as follows: “Cell phone technology, coupled with the widespread use of smart phones 
among American citizens, has enabled police to determine a person’s movements with nearly as much 
accuracy as a GPS device mounted on that person’s vehicle.  Cell phone data, for example, is often used 
to reveal where a cell phone was located at a particular point in time by identifying which cell tower 
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was utilized to make a call.  Cell location data makes 
it possible to determine a person’s movements with precision, and can operate successfully even when 
the phone is simply turned on, regardless of whether a call has been made or not.  Cell phone companies 
maintain accurate records of cell phone location information for all of its customers, making it possible 
for police to obtain a suspect’s location information by a simple request to a cell phone provider, such as 
AT&T or Verizon.  Please answer the following questions related to this emerging form of police 
investigation.” 
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order to acquire a suspect’s cell phone location information directly 
from a cell phone provider.  Each of these questions contained three 
initial answer choices: (1) “Yes, the police should have to get a warrant 
regardless of the nature of the crime being investigated;” (2) “No, the 
police shouldn’t have to get a warrant to do this;” and (3) “It depends on 
the nature of the crime the police are investigating.”   
For those respondents who picked answer choices (1) or (2), no 
additional questions were asked.  However, respondents who selected 
answer choice (3) were then asked to specify permissible lengths of 
surveillance for the following different types of suspects: (i) a person 
who has not been convicted of a crime and who is not suspected of 
committing any crime; (ii) a person who is not suspected of a crime and 
who has not been accused of committing any crime; (iii) a convicted 
felon who is not suspected of committing any crime; (iv) a convicted 
felon who is suspected of committing a crime; (v) a person suspected of 
planning or engaging in terrorist acts; (vi) a suspected drug dealer 
involved in a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving large amounts of 
cash and narcotics; (vii) a suspected serial killer; (viii) an individual 
suspected of using illegal drugs; (ix) a suspected car thief; (x) an 
individual suspected of illegally growing marijuana; and (xi) an 
individual suspected of engaging in a series of bank robberies.  
1. Survey Results 
The results of this survey are significant.  Most notably, society saw 
no statistically significant difference in tracking an individual by means 
of a GPS tracking device attached to that person’s vehicle and tracking 
that same individual by a GPS-enabled cell phone.  Generally speaking, 
the majority of respondents deemed location information data 
presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
whether that data is obtained by way of surreptitiously installed GPS or 
directly from a cell phone provider.  Moreover, while the results for 
each method of tracking were similar, society believed that tracking an 
individual by a GPS-enabled cell phone should receive somewhat 
greater Fourth Amendment protection than tracking an individual in the 
manner employed in Jones.   
The following chart summarizes these results: 
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GPS Tracking:  Should 
police be required to 
obtain a search warrant 
before they may attach a 
GPS device to a 
suspect’s vehicle? 
Cell Phone Tracking: 
Should police be 
required to obtain a 
search warrant in order 
to obtain a suspect’s cell 
phone location 
information directly 
from a cell phone 
provider? 
Yes, the police should 
have to get a warrant 
regardless of the nature 
of the crime being 
investigated 
51.7% 
(92 of 178) 
58.4% 
(101 of 173) 
No, the police 
shouldn’t have to get a 
warrant to do this 
9.0% 
(16 of 178) 
9.8% 
(17 of 173) 
It depends on the nature 
of the crime the police 
are investigating 
39.3% 
(70 of 178) 
31.8% 
(55 of 173) 
  
As with my initial survey, the results of this second survey further 
support the notion that Fourth Amendment protections in regards to GPS 
tracking should vary depending on the nature of the crime being 
investigated.   
While less than a majority, nearly 40% of all respondents indicated 
that the nature of the particular crime police are investigating should 
alter whether police should be required to obtain a warrant before they 
may attach a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle.  Nearly 32% of all 
respondents selected the same option with respect to obtaining a 
suspect’s cell phone location information directly from a cell phone 
provider.  Respondents who selected this particular answer choice were 
then given additional questions in which they were asked to specify 
permissible lengths of surveillance for different types of suspects. 
Digging deeper into the data, of the 70 respondents who believed the 
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking should depend on the 
nature of the crime police are investigating, only six would have allowed 
the movements of an innocent suspect (Suspect Type (i)) to be 
monitored without a warrant, whereas 61 would have required a warrant 
in this situation.230  By contrast, for the suspected terrorist (Suspect 
Type (v)), 64 respondents believed police should not be required to 
 
 230. Three of these 70 respondents did not answer the follow-up questions. 
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obtain a warrant to monitor this suspect’s movements by surreptitiously-
installed GPS, whereas only three indicated that police should have to 
obtain a search warrant to do so.  When these distinct types of suspects 
are compared, this data tends to support the argument that Fourth 
Amendment protections in regards to GPS tracking should indeed vary 
depending on the nature of the crime being investigated.   
When the other suspect types are examined (again, isolating only the 
40% of respondents who indicated that the constitutionality of 
warrantless GPS tracking should depend on the nature of the crime 
police are investigating) two distinct groups of suspects emerge: those 
suspected of relatively severe crimes and those suspected of either minor 
crimes or no crime at all.  As set forth in the charts that follow, society 
appears more willing to permit the warrantless GPS tracking of those 
suspected of committing relatively severe crimes vis-à-vis those 
suspected of either minor crimes or no crime at all.   
GPS Tracking: Those Suspected of Minor Crimes or of No Crime 




Type (ii): Not suspected 
nor accused of a crime 
4.6% 
(3 of 66) 
95.5% 
(63 of 66) 
Type (i): Not convicted 
nor suspected of a 
crime 
9.0% 
(6 of 67) 
91.0% 
(61 of 67) 
Type (viii): Suspected 
of using illegal drugs 
35.8% 
(24 of 67) 
64.2% 
(43 of 67) 




(25 of 67) 
62.7% 
(42 of 67) 
Type (iii): Convicted 
felon not suspected of 
any crime 
43.3% 
(29 of 67) 
56.7% 
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GPS Tracking: Those Suspected of Relatively Severe Crimes 




Type (v): Suspected 
terrorist 
95.5% 
(64 of 67) 
4.5% 
(3 of 67) 
Type (vii): Suspected 
serial killer 
91.0% 
(61 of 67) 
9.0% 
(6 of 67) 
Type (vi): Suspected 
drug dealer involved in 
a large-scale drug-
trafficking conspiracy  
86.6% 
(58 of 67) 
13.4% 
(9 of 67) 
Type (iv): Convicted 




(59 of 67) 
11.9% 
(8 of 67) 
Type (xi): Suspected of 
bank robberies 
74.6% 
(50 of 67) 
25.4% 
(17 of 67) 
Type (ix): Suspected car 
thief 
56.7% 
(38 of 67) 
43.3% 
(29 of 67) 
 
Although not reported in detail here, similar results appeared for the 
32% of respondents who believed the nature of the particular crime 
under investigation should determine whether a warrant is required 
before police may obtain a suspect’s cell phone location information 
directly from a cell phone provider. 
2. Conclusions 
Four important conclusions emerge from the collective responses to 
this second survey.  First, despite the particular method of GPS tracking 
employed (i.e., trespassorily attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s 
vehicle versus tracking a suspect’s movements by means of a GPS-
enabled smart phone) there is strong societal support for the overall 
outcome in Jones, which effectively limits the ability of police to obtain 
GPS tracking information without a warrant.  With respect to GPS 
tracking in the manner employed in Jones, 51.7% of survey respondents 
indicated that police should have to obtain a warrant regardless of the 
nature of the crime being investigated, and of the 39.3% of respondents 
who would have made the requirement of a warrant dependent upon the 
nature of the crime, many of those respondents would have been 
unwilling to permit warrantless GPS tracking for the type of suspect at 
issue in Jones—the suspected drug dealer. 
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Second, society appears unwilling to assume the risk that information 
exposed to cell phone providers (such as the location of their phone 
during calls) will be shared with law enforcement in the absence of a 
warrant.  Rather, as a general matter, society deems location information 
data presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
whether that data is obtained surreptitiously by the police or directly 
from a cell phone provider.   
Third, society tends to agree that Fourth Amendment protections 
relating to GPS tracking should vary depending on the nature of the 
crime being investigated and on the length of surveillance.   
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society saw no statistically 
significant difference in tracking an individual by means of a GPS 
tracking device attached to that person’s vehicle and tracking that same 
individual by smart-phone enabled GPS.  If anything, society believed 
that tracking an individual by smart-phone enabled GPS should receive 
somewhat greater Fourth Amendment protection than tracking an 
individual in the manner employed in Jones.  This particular result is 
significant in its potential to impact the developing law of cell phone 
tracking, which remains much more unsettled than the scenario in Jones. 
V. A SLIDING SCALE FRAMEWORK FOR CELL PHONE AND GPS TRACKING 
In Jones, the Court did not resolve whether a warrant, probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, or some other standard would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment with respect to the particular method of GPS tracking 
employed in Jones.231  The Court has also not set forth any standards to 
govern the acquisition of cell site location information, and courts across 
the country are imposing different Fourth Amendment requirements in 
otherwise similar cases.232  Thus, the question of what would make a 
particular instance of GPS or cell phone tracking constitutionally 
“reasonable” remains unresolved, and greater clarity is needed.233 
Even assuming that the Fourth Amendment would govern all 
instances of GPS or cell phone tracking, not every Fourth Amendment 
intrusion requires a warrant or probable cause; rather, as the Supreme 
Court has declared on a number of occasions, the Fourth Amendment’s 
general restriction against “unreasonable searches and seizures” requires 
 
 231. United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *4 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012). 
 232. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 137–139 (noting that in many districts prosecutors 
may obtain prospective cell site information under a reasonable suspicion standard, whereas some 
magistrate judges require probable cause before authorizing law enforcement access to any type of 
prospective cell site data). 
 233. See id. at 121–22 (“determining the proper access standard” for cell phone location 
information “is anything but clear under current law”).   
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a case-specific analysis as to what is “reasonable.”234  Under this 
method of Fourth Amendment analysis, “reasonableness” is determined 
under a balancing test, weighing the government’s and individual’s 
interests against each other.235  In cases where the government’s interest 
is substantial, as in the investigation of the most extreme offenses, and 
the individual’s privacy interest is less so, departures from the usual 
requirements of a warrant and probable cause may be justified.236   
With electronic monitoring of a suspect’s location, the government’s 
interest in effective crime prevention is heightened when investigating 
the most serious offenses, particularly those that threaten the national 
security, such as terrorism investigations.  On the other side of the 
ledger, the electronic monitoring of a person’s movements becomes 
more invasive the longer an individual is tracked.237  Balancing the 
competing interests suggests that Fourth Amendment requirements 
should vary based upon the suspected crime and length of surveillance, 
an approach that is confirmed by my survey results.238   
While the notion of varying Fourth Amendment protections based 
 
 234. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).  See also Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns 
upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive 
force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen 
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . ‘reasonableness’ standard.”). 
 235. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) 
entails’”). 
 236. Under this approach, police may conduct a wide array of less intrusive searches and seizures 
on the basis of “reasonable suspicion,” a lesser standard of cause than “probable cause.”  The 
“reasonableness” balancing test of Terry v. Ohio has been applied in a number of settings, including: 
searches of public school students, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (upholding 
search of public school student based on reasonable suspicion); probationers, United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001) (upholding search of probationer’s home based on reasonable suspicion); and 
parolees, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (individualized suspicion not required for search of 
parolee’s home or person). 
 237. GPS tracking enables the government to track a suspect’s movements twenty-four hours a 
day for extended periods of time.  Discovering the whole of one’s movements over such a long time is 
far more invasive of privacy than discovering one’s movements during a single journey.  Under this type 
of prolonged surveillance, police can “deduce whether [the suspect] is a weekly church goer, a heavy 
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all 
such facts.”  The combination of these observations “tell[s] a story not told by any single visit.”  United 
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Moreover, it would be incredibly difficult, if 
not impossible, to replicate the advantages of GPS tracking on a large-scale basis through more 
traditional forms of surveillance.  See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440–44 (2009) (“GPS is 
a . . . powerful technology that is easily and cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and 
remarkably precise tracking capability . . . .  The potential for a similar capture of information or 
‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require . . . millions of additional police officers and cameras on 
every street lamp.”). 
 238. See supra notes 221–231 and accompanying text. 
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upon the suspected crime and length of surveillance seems empirically 
justified, Fourth Amendment case law also reflects a similar approach.  
As Skinner, Estrella, and Luna-Santillanes indicate, tracking a suspect’s 
vehicle by GPS for only a few days should not require a search warrant.  
By contrast, consistent with the opinions of the five concurring Justices 
in Jones, tracking the movements of a suspect like Antoine Jones, a 
suspected drug dealer, for twenty-eight days or longer should receive 
Fourth Amendment protection—presumably the full protection of a 
warrant.  
Jones involved an investigation of cocaine trafficking involving large 
amounts of drugs, one that ultimately led to severe charges against the 
suspect and an eventual sentence of life imprisonment.239  Starting with 
the type of suspect in Jones, we could begin to fashion a framework for 
GPS tracking legislation where tracking any suspect for twenty-eight 
days or longer would always require a search warrant.  Because Jones 
involved a relatively severe offense, this twenty-eight day outer limit 
would apply regardless of how severe the crime under investigation.  On 
the other hand, due to the less invasive nature of a more limited track, 
tracking a suspect like Jones for three days or less might not require a 
warrant, but may instead require a lesser degree of individualized 
suspicion, perhaps reasonable suspicion.240  With such a large time gap 
between these two points, the line where warrants would be required 
would need to be established.   
Consistent with recent, similar proposals, the framework proposed 
below would not vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon the 
particular method of electronic tracking.241  Rather, under my proposal, 
all forms of electronic tracking would be subject to the same 
requirements.   
This approach not only brings needed consistency to this area, but is 
also supported by my survey results.  As those results indicate, society 
deems location information data presumptively protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of whether that data is obtained surreptitiously 
by the police or obtained directly from a cell phone provider.  Moreover, 
 
 239. See Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 
2011 WL 5094951. 
 240. As compared to probable cause, the Supreme Court has declared that the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard is “obviously less demanding than that for probable cause,” United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), and requires “considerably less” proof of wrongdoing than proof by a 
preponderance of evidence.  Id.  Under this standard, police may not act on the basis of an 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch; rather, an officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable 
facts” that, along with reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the intrusion.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 241. See Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(proposing the requirement of a warrant for the government to intercept or force service providers to 
disclose geolocation data of any kind). 
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as technology continues to evolve, cell site location information is 
becoming as accurate, in some instances even more so, than GPS 
tracking,242 thus triggering the same privacy concerns as those 
highlighted by the concurring Justices in Jones.  Given these concerns, 
my proposal does not vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon 
the particular method of tracking employed.   
A. Proposal Details 
As noted, there is societal support for varying Fourth Amendment 
protections with respect to GPS tracking based upon the nature of the 
crime under investigation and length of surveillance.  My proposal 
incorporates this approach by designating three distinct categories of 
individuals and proposing different standards for each.   
1. Those Suspected of Severe Crimes 
For investigations of relatively severe offenses, my proposal is that 
police may track an individual by GPS for up to six days without the 
need for prior judicial approval.  Under this proposal, police would need 
to first establish, and document in advance, reasonable suspicion before 
they may track an individual by GPS, whether through surreptitiously 
installed GPS devices or through cell phone tracking;243 however, police 
would not need prior judicial approval to do so.  If, however, a particular 
investigation would require lengthier tracking, police would be required 
to obtain probable cause and a search warrant to continue that 
monitoring.  To obtain such authorization, police must further establish 
a case-specific need for additional location information extending 
beyond six days.  Moreover, at this time, police would be required to 
demonstrate the factual basis for their initial finding of reasonable 
suspicion, which would deter the arbitrary use of this investigative 
power and which mirrors what a prosecutor must do to defend against a 
motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of a Terry stop.   
The category of relatively severe offenses would include 
investigations of suspected terrorist activity; large-scale drug trafficking 
investigations, the type of investigation where the use of GPS tracking 
devices has been most common; and investigations of those felonies 
generally recognized by statute as the most extreme, including 
 
 242. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
 243. Under this standard, police would need to document in advance their basis for reasonable 
suspicion, and be prepared to argue that reasonable suspicion was indeed obtained in advance of such 
tracking in the event of a motion to suppress any evidence linked to that investigation. 
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homicides, robbery, burglary, arson, and kidnapping.244   
This six-day proposal is consistent with my survey results.  For 
example, in my first GPS tracking survey, for the relatively severe 
offenses such as the suspected terrorist, the tipping point, where a 
majority of society would require judicial supervision, appears to be 6–
10 days of tracking.  This is illustrated by the chart that follows.  When 
reviewing this chart, each number in the chart represents the percentage 
of survey respondents who selected a particular answer choice.  For 
example, the top left-hand corner of the chart indicates that 89.1% of 
survey respondents believed that warrants are always required to track 
the movements of an innocent suspect by GPS, whereas the bottom 
right-hand corner of the chart indicates that 39.4% of survey 
respondents would permit warrantless tracking of the suspected terrorist 
to extend for twenty-one days or longer.  To make sense of this data, one 
must identify the tipping point where a majority of society would 









required 89.1% 52.9% 32.7% 
Warrantless Tracking 
Permitted for  
1 day or less 
3.0% 3.6% 4.0% 
Warrantless Tracking 
Permitted for  
2–5 days 
4.4% 10.3% 8.4% 
Warrantless Tracking 
Permitted for  
6–10 days 
2.2% 9.0% 7.5% 
Warrantless Tracking 
Permitted for  
11–20 days 
0.0% 3.6% 7.5% 
Warrantless Tracking 
Permitted for  
21 days or longer 
1.3% 20.6% 39.4% 
 
As this chart illustrates, for the suspected terrorist, 45.1% of society 
(32.7% + 4.0% + 8.4%) would not permit GPS tracking to extend 
beyond five days without a warrant, and a majority of society, 54.4%, 
 
 244. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (designating as sufficient to raise an otherwise 
unintentional homicide to murder all killings committed during the course of a “robbery, rape or deviate 
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape”). 
45
McAllister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical Analy
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
252 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
would not permit GPS tracking to extend beyond ten days without a 
warrant.  This data, while not perfectly precise, suggests that judicial 
supervision for the investigation of the most serious offenses should 
begin somewhere within the 6–10 day range. 
In contrast, only 24.2% of survey respondents (3.6% + 20.6%) would 
permit warrantless GPS tracking to extend beyond ten days for a suspect 
similar to Antoine Jones, as opposed to the 45.1% who were willing to 
do so for the suspected terrorist.  As set forth more fully below, this data 
suggests that less severe offenses should generally remain subject to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.   
2. Those Suspected of Minor Crimes 
For all suspected crimes not falling into the category of severe crimes 
identified above, I propose police be required to establish reasonable 
suspicion in order to track an individual for up to three days.  This 
proposal is consistent with the holdings in Knotts, Skinner, Estrella, and 
Luna-Santillanes, in the sense that no prior judicial approval would be 
necessary to track those suspected of less severe crimes for a relatively 
short period of time.  Moreover, this proposal is consistent with the 
ability to simply track a suspect turn-by-turn without the need for prior 
judicial approval.  If, however, a particular investigation would require 
lengthier tracking, police would then be required to obtain a search 
warrant from a judicial officer to continue that monitoring.  Under this 
proposal, the warrant affidavit must establish the basis for probable 
cause and must further establish a case-specific need for additional 
location information extending beyond three days.  Moreover, at this 
time, police would be required to demonstrate the factual basis for their 
initial finding of reasonable suspicion, a requirement that would again 
help deter the arbitrary use of this investigative power.   
3. Those Not Suspected of Any Crime 
Finally, consistent with the results of each of my surveys, and 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s restriction against general, 
exploratory searches, an individual who is not suspected of committing 
any offense could not be tracked by GPS for any period of time, 
regardless of the method of tracking.   
This particular proposal would account for the concerns of the Jones 
Court regarding the possibility of mass surveillance in the absence of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing245 and would be consistent with 
 
 245. Indeed, Jones apparently forecloses the possibility of “affixing GPS tracking devices to 
46
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/5
2013] GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING 253 
society’s belief, as expressed in my surveys, that police should never be 
permitted to obtain data regarding the movements of ordinary, law-
abiding citizens in the absence of a particularized showing of 
wrongdoing.246   
B. Support for this Proposal 
Despite its ruling on the constitutionality of GPS tracking under the 
particular circumstances at issue in Jones, the Jones Court did not 
resolve whether a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or 
some other standard would satisfy the Fourth Amendment where a 
particular instance of GPS tracking constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search.247  Moreover, the competing interests between law enforcement 
needs and privacy concerns triggered by this form of investigation 
suggest the need for flexibility in legal standards, a need the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness approach can accommodate.  Because the 
Fourth Amendment, at its core, simply prohibits “unreasonable searches 
and seizures,” the Supreme Court has declared that “in principle every 
Fourth Amendment case . . . turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ 
determination, [which in turn] involves a balancing of all relevant 
factors.”248  This approach to Fourth Amendment analysis, where the 
government’s interests and individual’s interests are pitted against each 
other in any given case, suggests the adoption of a “sliding scale of 
suspicion”—one that depends on the government’s need for, and the 
level of invasiveness of, any particular instance of tracking.  In the realm 
of electronic tracking, the government’s interest in effective crime 
prevention increases when investigating the most serious offenses, 
whereas the level of intrusiveness generated by such monitoring 
increases the longer an individual is tracked.  By adopting a “sliding 
scale of suspicion,” one that is calibrated to the particular competing 
interests of any given case, my proposal is consistent with this 
reasonableness-based approach to the Fourth Amendment.249   
On the law enforcement side, this proposal gives police greater 
 
thousands of cars at random,” at least where doing so involves a physical trespass upon the vehicle.  See 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing this possibility in the pre-
Jones world). 
 246. See supra notes 221–226 and accompanying text. 
 247. United States v. Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *4 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012). 
 248. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996). 
 249. Post-Jones courts appear willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections in a “sliding scale” 
manner.  For example, the Seventh Circuit recently declared that its “‘sliding scale’ of suspicion,” under 
which “[h]ow much cause agents need to do something [would] depend[] on how deeply they invade the 
zone of privacy,” “survived Jones, which means that the ‘sliding scale’ approach may allow minimally 
invasive intrusion on property interests, not merely privacy interests.”  United States v. Peter, No. 3:11-
CR-132 JD, 2012 WL 1900133, at *15 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2012). 
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flexibility in the use of GPS tracking to investigate the most serious 
offenses.  One senior Department of Justice official recently told a 
Senate Committee that “if an amendment [to existing federal statutes] 
were to unduly restrict the ability of law enforcement to quickly and 
efficiently determine the general location of a terrorist, kidnapper, child 
predator, computer hacker, or other dangerous criminal, it would have a 
very real and very human cost.”250  Similarly, in a recent GPS tracking 
case, United States v. Katzin,251 a federal district court declared that “the 
possibly unfettered uses by law enforcement of GPS tracking to gather 
evidence to . . . establish probable cause in cases of serious crimes like 
drug trafficking, terrorism, and the like, strongly outweigh the concern 
about intrusion.”252  I echo these concerns.  As the Government argued 
in Katzin,  
GPS monitoring of a vehicle, at least for a limited period of time on 
public roads, is [minimally invasive] in that (1) individuals have a 
diminished expectation of privacy when traveling on public 
thoroughfares, (2) the intrusion of the installation of a tracking device is 
minimal, and (3) the information gathered is less detailed than would be 
achieved with visual or aural means of surveillance.  [Moreover,] the 
GPS tracker cannot even reveal information such as who is in the car, 
who is driving the car, or what the occupants do when they arrive at their 
ostensible destination—all information that would be revealed . . . by 
traditional visual surveillance.253 
Given the arguably reduced privacy concerns inherent in GPS 
tracking, the case for warrantless GPS tracking of the most serious 
offenses is much stronger.254   
Relaxing Fourth Amendment protections in the more extreme cases is 
further supported by recent Congressional and judicial decisions.  For 
example, in 1986, Congress placed statutory restrictions on the use of 
 
 250. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 123 (quoting The Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 251. United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012). 
 252. Id. at *5. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Unlike the type of GPS tracking at issue in Jones, under which the location of a suspect’s 
vehicle may be tracked continually, simply “pinging” a cell phone periodically to determine its location 
is far less invasive of privacy than a continual surveillance would be.  Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[F]or four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every 
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving.  We need not identify with precision the 
point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-
week mark.”) (emphasis added). 
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pen registers by law enforcement.255  However, as a result of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress granted special powers 
to the Attorney General to authorize use of pen registers without prior 
court approval in emergency circumstances relating to international 
terrorism and foreign intelligence.256  More recently, the Supreme Court 
rejected a challenge to a federal law that broadened the government’s 
power to eavesdrop on international phone calls and e-mails, a ruling 
which exemplifies the Court’s willingness to permit relaxed standards in 
the investigation of the most serious offenses.257  Thus, the notion that 
Fourth Amendment protections should vary depending on the nature of 
the crime being investigated, particularly in the realm of terrorist 
investigations, is consistent with recent federal statutes and Supreme 
Court opinions.258   
Finally, because my proposal could be easily converted into draft 
legislation, my proposal is consistent with Justice Alito’s suggestion in 
Jones, which encourages legislative solutions.  According to Justice 
Alito, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the 
best solution . . . may be legislative [because] [a] legislative body is well 
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to 
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”259  By 
incorporating the very “public attitudes” Justice Alito highlights, an 
opinion which was endorsed by three additional Justices, my proposal 
would likely garner support from a majority of Supreme Court Justices.   
Moreover, as a proposed legislative framework, my proposal is 
consistent with the recent efforts of various states to enact legislation 
that would place definitive restrictions upon law enforcement’s ability to 
acquire location information.  As of March 2013, at least eleven states 
had introduced bills designed to govern law enforcement’s acquisition 
of location information, with many of those bills including provisions 
designed to restrict the acquisition of cell phone information.260  My 
 
 255. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3126 (2012).  A pen register is a mechanical device that records the 
numbers dialed on a telephone; it does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether 
calls are actually completed.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979). 
 256. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842–1843 (2012). 
 257. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 258. Such distinctions derive from the Court’s decision in United States v. United States Dist. 
Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972), in which the Court explained that the standards 
and procedures that law enforcement officials must follow when conducting “surveillance of ‘ordinary 
crime’ might not be required in the context of surveillance conducted for domestic national-security 
purposes.” 
 259. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).  See also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 
114, at 150–51 (emphasizing the need for legislative solutions in this area of law). 
 260. Cyrus Farivar, Texas Proposes One of Nation’s “Most Sweeping” Mobile Privacy Laws, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 6, 2013, 8:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/texas-proposes-one-of-
nations-most-sweeping-mobile-privacy-laws/. 
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proposal continues this trend, and goes further by adopting one uniform 
set of standards that would likely pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government’s installation 
of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle and subsequent use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment “search.”261  The precise holding of Jones was limited to 
the particular form of GPS monitoring in which police attach a GPS 
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle.262  Jones did not determine 
the constitutionality of similar forms of tracking accomplished in the 
absence of a trespass, such as cell phone tracking; nor did Jones resolve 
whether a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or some other 
standard would make any particular instance of GPS tracking 
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, five Justices in 
Jones suggested that a twenty-eight day monitoring period utilizing the 
same method of GPS tracking employed in Jones might not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment where the investigation involved a more serious 
offense than that in Jones, and the remainder of the Court appeared 
willing to address such issues in future cases.   
In the months following Jones, I administered two surveys designed 
to explore possible distinctions in GPS tracking based upon the factors 
highlighted in Jones—most notably, the nature of the crime under 
investigation and the length of GPS monitoring.  The results of these 
surveys suggest that society is indeed willing to permit warrantless GPS 
tracking for a longer period of time when investigating the most serious 
offenses.  Reflecting society’s beliefs as to what is “reasonable” in this 
method of investigation, I have set forth a proposal that would make the 
constitutionality of GPS tracking dependent upon the nature of the crime 
under investigation and the length of surveillance, specifically, by 
designating three distinct categories of individuals and proposing 
different standards for each.  With the law of cell phone tracking 
unresolved and ever-changing, this proposal provides a consistent 
framework for law enforcement and courts to utilize as these issues 
arise, one which enjoys both empirical and normative support. 
 
 261. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012).  
 262. Id. at 948. 
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